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Abstract
The first chapter examines the interaction of heterogeneous firms in a competitive market in which
firms motivate their workers using relational incentive contracts. In the steady-state rational-
expectations equilibrium, aggregate TFP is fully characterized by a weighted average of firm-specific
sustainable effort levels. Relational contracts amplify exogenous productivity heterogeneity and
lead to dispersion in the net marginal revenue product of labor. Improvements in formal con-
tracting disproportionately benefits low-productivity firms, leading to a greater dispersion of the
net marginal revenue product of labor in weaker contracting environments. Thus, cross-country
differences in contracting institutions can partially explain the observed pattern that misallocation
is more pronounced in developing countries.
The second chapter explores organizational responses to influence activities-costly activities
aimed at persuading a decision maker. Rigid organizational practices that might otherwise seem
inefficient can optimally arise. If more complex decisions are more susceptible to influence activ-
ities, optimal selection may partially account for the observed correlation between the quality of
management practices and firm performance reported in Bloom and Van Reenen (2007). Further,
the boundaries of the firm can be shaped by the potential for influence activities, providing a the-
ory of the firm based on ex-post inefficiencies. Finally, boundaries and bureaucratic institutions
interact: more concentrated decision-making and bureaucratic institutions are complements.
The third chapter (co-authored with Robert Gibbons and Richard Holden) analyzes a rational-
expectations model of price formation in an intermediate-good market under uncertainty. There
is a continuum of firms, each consisting of a party who can reduce production cost and a party
who can discover information about demand. Both parties can make specific investments at private
cost, and there is a machine that either party can control. As in incomplete-contracting models,
different control structures create different incentives for the parties' investments. As in rational-
expectations models, some parties may invest in acquiring information, which is then incorporated
into the market-clearing price of the intermediate good by these parties' production decisions. The
informativeness of the price mechanism affects the returns to specific investments and hence the
optimal control structure for individual firms; meanwhile, the control structure choices by individual
firms affect the informativeness of the price mechanism. In equilibrium the informativeness of the
price mechanism can induce ex ante homogeneous firms to choose heterogeneous control structures.
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Chapter 1
Relational Incentive Contracts and
Persistent Misallocation
1.1 Introduction
In the absence of perfect formal contracts, trust is an important input to the production process.
Recent empirical work by Bloom, Sadun, and Van Reenen (2011) suggests that lack of trust con-
strains firm size by limiting the decentralization of important operating decisions.1 As a result,
productive firms that would like to expand cannot, which potentially has important implications
for the aggregate TFP of an economy. In this paper, I develop a simple model of relational incentive
contracts to analyze the consequences of limited trust on the steady state distribution of firm size
and aggregate TFP.
I view trust as a self-enforcing agreement of a repeated principal-agent game (Bull, 1987;
MacLeod and Malcomson 1989; Levin 2003) between a firm owner (principal) and many man-
agers (agents). The principal would like to incentivize each agent to exert effort, 2 but she is unable
to do so using a formal contract. Instead, she can promise to pay a pre-specified bonus3 if the
Firm owners may lock up spare parts for machines, depriving local managers of the ability to perform repairs
when a machine breaks down, for if they did not, the managers might steal the parts, sell them, and replace them
with low-quality parts. They may require managers to obtain approval from the owner to make capital investments
greater than $500, hire non-temporary personnel, or make sales and marketing decisions.
2 Or, since the stage game of the principal-agent problem is a trust game, the principal gives the agent discretion
over some resources, and the agent can convert those resources into output or use them in a socially wasteful, privately
beneficial, way.
3Discretionary payments take the form of monetary bonuses in the relational incentive contracting literature.
They are typically interpreted as raises, promotions, additional freedom, and improved working conditions that can
be awarded to an agent in a contingent way.
agent chooses a particular effort level. The principal lacks commitment, so in a one-shot game,
after the agent's effort has been sunk, the principal would always prefer not to pay the bonus (to
renege); thus, a forward-looking agent will not choose a positive effort level. However, through
repeated interaction, the principal can use some of the future surplus it generates as collateral for
this promise.
I augment the canonical relational contracting model with two additional elements: multiple
agents and endogenous competitive rents. In any given period, the principal hires potentially many
agents. Using the same logic as Bernheim and Whinston (1990) and Levin (2002), I argue that
a multilateral relational contract always dominates a sequence of bilateral relational contracts.
The intuition is straightforward: to implement a given effort vector using a sequence of bilateral
relational contracts, the effort vector must satisfy the aggregate reneging constraint as well as
additional individual reneging constraints. Using a multilateral relational contract simply implies
that the principal can reduce the number of constraints he faces, and he always performs weakly
better by doing so (and in fact, if efforts are substitutes across agents, strictly better). This makes
the principal's choice of the number of agents one of deciding upon the size of the workforce and
then treating the workforce as a single agent. The dynamic enforcement constraint then requires
that the aggregate reneging temptation (which here will be the aggregate volume of promised
bonuses) must be smaller than the expected net present value of future competitive rents. If there
are diminishing returns to scale, 4 the aggregate promised bonus (and hence principal's reneging
temptation) increases linearly in the number of agents the firm employs, whereas the marginal
returns are decreasing, and thus the dynamic enforcement constraint can provide a cap on the size
of a firm's workforce.
The product of the principal-agent problem is output that is sold into a competitive product
market. The second additional element is the endogeneity of competitive rents. In this model,
there are many firms, each producing output and selling it on the competitive market. Each firm
makes a conjecture about the stream of future output prices, which determines its ability to sustain
cooperation through an optimal relational contract-and hence its output-in any given period.
Equilibrium prices are determined by supply and demand, and thus the expected net present
value of future competitive rents must be consistent with market clearing in all future periods. I
therefore focus on rational expectations equilibrium and show that under some regularity conditions,
"I show that under constant returns to scale, there does not exist a competitive equilibrium. This is because CRS
implies zero competitive rents, and relational incentives require strictly positive rents. These are incompatible.
a stationary rational expectations equilibrium always exists.
In the stationary rational expectations equilibrium, the model reduces to a Lucas span-of-control
model with an additional constraint that depends on the contractual frictions. This allows me to
provide a simple characterization of aggregate TFP as a weighted average of the sustainable effort
levels in the firms in the economy. Since the efficiency of a firm is determined by its competitive
rents, aggregate TFP is determined by variables that determine the levels of competitive rents a
firm earns, including prices and firm turnover. This creates a non-standard feedback between the
price level of the economy and the efficiency of firms in the economy.
I also show that the quality of the formal contracting environment a firm operates in is an
important determinant of TFP. Firms with lower productivity potential earn less in equilibrium,
and thus cannot sustain as much effort. Improvements in formal contracting institutions dispropor-
tionately benefit such firms, leading to a greater dispersion of total factor productivity in weaker
contracting environments if one holds all else equal. Thus, cross-country differences in contract-
ing institutions can partially explain the observed pattern that misallocation is more pronounced
in developing countries. However, differences in formal contracting institutions will also lead to
differences in the price level. I show that when one takes these general equilibrium effects into
account, improvements in formal contracting institutions leads to compression in firm size-small
firms produce more and large firms produce less.
This paper is related to the recent literature on misallocation and economic growth (Banerjee
and Duflo 2005; Jeong and Townsend 2007; Restuccia and Rogerson 2008; Hsieh and Klenow 2009;
Bartelsman, Haltiwanger, and Scarpetta 2008), which has argued that cross-country differences in
the ability to efficiently allocate resources can explain a substantial portion of the differences in
per-capita GDP. These papers argue that misallocation of productive resources is ubiquitous, but
it is more pronounced in developing countries than in developed countries. Hsieh and Klenow show
that improving the allocation of capital and labor in China and India to U.S. levels would result in
a one-off increase in per-capita GDP by 30-50% and 40-60% respectively.
In order to design effective policy aimed at improving the allocation of resources, one first needs
to understand why they were not allocated efficiently to begin with. Restuccia and Rogerson and
Hsieh and Klenow remain agnostic as to the mechanism (positing firm-specific capital and labor
taxes or wedges), but several recent papers in the macro tradition (Banerjee and Moll 2010; Moll
2010; Buera, Kaboski, and Shin 2010; Midrigan and Xu 2010) have focused on the role of under-
developed financial markets. 56 Others include Peters (2011), who argues that in a monopolistic
competition framework, heterogeneity in entry rates leads to heterogeneity in markups, which in
turn leads to a distortion in relative output prices and thus misallocation. Collard-Wexler, Asker,
and De Loecker (2011) argue that much of the misallocation is driven by adjustment costs. Guner,
Ventura, and Xu (2008) and Garicano, Lelarge, and Van Reenen (2011) highlight the importance
of existing size-dependent policies on whether or not firms operate at their efficient scale.
The normative implications of each of these explanations differs. For example, if misallocation
is driven solely by adjustment costs, then there is little scope for policy in reducing this. If, on the
other hand, heterogeneity in markups is the driving factor, then we want to understand why there is
heterogeneity in entry rates and perhaps remedy this by selectively reducing entry barriers in certain
industries. If underdeveloped financial markets are the problem, then top-down improvements in
financial markets could reduce misallocation. My model generates persistent misallocation in a
perfectly competitive environment with no adjustment costs or credit rationing, and is therefore
complementary to existing views. It suggests that policy should focus on the quality of formal
contracting environments.
This paper is also related to the organizational economics literature on persistent performance
differences among seemingly similar enterprises. Most closely related here are Chassang (2010)
and Gibbons and Henderson (2011), who argue that firm-level heterogeneity in productivity is
due to differences in (ex ante identical) firms' success in developing relational contracts that put
them on the production possibilities frontier. 7 In contrast, I posit that all firms are successful
in implementing optimal relational contracts and thus all operate on the production possibilities
frontier. However, small differences in firm-level productivity potential translate into differences
in continuation values and potentially large differences in sustainable effort levels and thus TFP.
Relational incentive contracts can therefore amplify existing differences. The analysis in this paper
is silent on firm dynamics, unlike Chassang (2010) and Ellison and Holden (2009). It provides a
theory of steady state misallocation, not a theory of the process that leads to it.
"In a static model, mismatch between the quality of ideas of an entrepreneur and the funding necessary to take
the idea to fruition can lead to misallocation. However, in the long run, entrepreneurs with the best ideas should be
able to save their way out of capital constraints. This argument forms the basis of the title of Banerjee and Moll
(2010)'s paper, "Why Does Misallocation Persist?"
"The firms in Hsieh and Klenow (2009)'s study are large manufacturing firms that are in the top 2% of the firm
size distribution. Such firms are likely to be well-connected to financial markets and therefore are less likely to be
subject to credit rationing of this sort.
' Also related is Ellison and Holden (2009), who show the potential for path-dependence in the efficiency of
organizational rules.
Finally, there is a growing literature on the macroeconomic implications of contractual incom-
pleteness (Caballero and Hammour 1998; Cooley, Marimon, and Quadrini 2004; Acemoglu, Antras,
and Helpman 2007). My analysis is most similar to Acemoglu, Antras, and Helpman (2007), who
examine the role of incomplete contracts and unresolved hold-up on technology adoption. In con-
trast, I explore how the success of attempts to resolve contractual incompleteness using relational
contracts varies with underlying firm characteristics.
Section 2 sets up the basic model. Section 3 characterizes the solution in the complete contracts
case. Secion 4 analyzes optimal relational incentive contracts in the absence of formal contracts,
and section 5 explores applications of the main results and extends the model to incorporate the
possibility of formal contracting. Section 6 concludes.
1.2 Setup and Technology
There is a unit mass of firms, indexed by i E [0, 1]. Each firm is run by a risk-neutral principal who is
the residual claimant. As in standard models of production, output requires both capital and labor.
As in standard principal-agent models, an agent is productive only if he exerts effort. Contracting
institutions are weak and thus effort cannot be directly contracted upon. Throughout, we will
assume that there is a large enough mass of risk-neutral agents (so that in equilibrium, they are
indifferent between working and not). Play is infinitely repeated, and we denote by t = 1, 2, 3,...
the period. All players share a common discount factor, which we will express in terms of a discount
rate 1. The product of the principal-agent problem is output, which is homogeneous across firms
and sold into a competitive product market. Aggregate demand is assumed to be stationary,
Dt (pt) D (pt), where pt is the output price in period t, and downward-sloping (D' < 0).
P - pay fixed P - offer each A A - choose Output sold into
cost F,? (see, bj effort is market at pricep:
t t+1
P - rent K. A -accept/ P- pay
hire L., reject? bonusbe?
Figure 1: Timing
Each period consists of seven stages. In the first stage, the principal i decides whether or not to
pay the fixed cost of production, F. If she chooses to, in the second stage, she decides how much
capital Kit to rent at rental rate Rt and the mass Lit of agents to whom she would like to make
an offer. In stage 3, the principal offers each agent f E [0, Lit] a triple (site (pie) , cite, bite), where
Site (pite) is a payment that potentially depends on a contractible measure pitf of agent E's effort,8
cste is a proposed effort level, and bite is a bonus that the principal intends to pay agent if and only
if he chooses the proposed effort level. In the fourth period, each agent f decides whether or not to
accept this proposed contract or reject it in favor of outside opportunity that yields utility W > 0.
If agent f accepts the contract, in stage 5, he chooses an effort level kite > 0 at cost c (dite) cBte.
This effort is commonly observed, and in stage 6, the principal decides whether or not to pay agent
f a bonus if bite. Output for firm i is then realized and sold into the market at price pt in stage 7.
Firms have heterogeneous productivity potential. 9 Let A. denote the potential of firm i. Assume
Ai ~ G (At), where G is a distribution function. Given capital Kit and a mass Lit of workers who
choose efforts dit- {dZte MLa, firm i's production in period t is given by
yi (eit, Kit, Lit) = At Kt (ezte) I 1 dE)
"Throughout, we assume that perfectly enforceable contracts can be written on pitt but that no contracts can be
written directly on effort.
"Some are founded on better ideas, possess more appropriate managerial skills for the environment they operate
in, or are more successful in adopting good management practices.
Throughout, make the following assumption.
Assumption 1. 0 < 1 - o - 0.
Assumption 1 ensures that the first-order conditions for the unconstrained problem are sufficient,
and it also implies that the efforts of the agents are substitutes. In period t, if principal i pays all
bonuses, her profits are
ptyi (eit, Kit, Lit) - RtKit - (site (pite) + bite) df - F.
We will analyze the principal's optimal solution to this problem when different performance
measures are available. The next section analyzes the case where pite (eite) = ette, so that formal
contracts can be written directly on effort (obviating the need to use relational incentives), and
the section that follows examines the pure relational incentives case, where pite (cite) is constant.
Intermediate cases are considered in Section 5.
Throughout, I assume that the rental rate of capital is exogenously given and constant at
R.1 Additionally, the product market structure is as in Lucas (1978). Alternatively, as I show in
Appendix B, this model is equivalent to a monopolistic competition model, where Ai is a function
of the size of the market for the variety that firm i produces. Finally, the mass of firms in the
economy is fixed at 1. In Appendix C, I allow for endogenous firm entry. As in Hopenhayn (1992),
a firm can pay a sunk cost F' to enter the market and draw a value Ai ~ G. The resulting mass
of entrants is determined by an indifference condition.
1.3 Complete Contracts
As a benchmark, consider the case where pite (eite) = eite, so that the principal can use the con-
tractible portion of the payment, site, to both pin the each agent to his (IR) constraint and directly
choose his effort (say, by setting sWe (&te # eite) = -oo). Because in this case, there are no intertem-
poral linkages in the problem, each firm can solve its profit-maximization problem period-by-period.
Given a price level pt, principal i wants to choose Lit, {eite}e [oLi] , and Kit to solve the following
"'I will be focusing on the steady state of this economy. Consequently, it is possible to microfound the stationary
aggregate demand function and constant rental rate by specifying an underlying consumer choice model, but for
simplicity, I do not do this.
problem.
-L it o -
-
0 -L it
max pt A /i K (eit) I-a-O de - RKi1 - sztedt - F (1.1)
KitLit{eites .0
subject to each worker's individual rationality constraint, which will hold with equality
sla - ceite = W.
By Assumption 1, the firm's problem is concave in {eite }O,Lit], so any optimal solution must
satisfy eite = eit for all f. Recognizing this and substituting the (IR) constraint into (1.1), the
problem becomes
max ptAjeOKy L1-*e- - RKit - (W + ceit) Lit - F.
Kit,Lit,eit Zit t
There will be some shutdown value of productivity potential, As, for which Ai < As implies that
a firm with potential Ai should optimally not produce. The solution to this problem is captured inl
the following proposition.
Proposition 1.1 Let
As-FO c ( R " W 1 a-20As = _ _
p o2 a 1 -20
H (pt,A) = (ptA))j ) - 20)
The unconstrained solution to firm i's problem is
FB W 0
1 - - 20 c
LFB (A) = a - 2 0 H (pt, Ai) eFB
W
KFB(Al) = H(pt, AT) eFB
R
if At > As. If Ai < As, firm i optimally does not produce.
Since the solution to the period t problem does not depend on variables from any other period,
and demand is stationary, output prices will be constant, pt = p for all t. A competitive equilibrium
is then a price level p, and a vector of firm-level choices {Kj, Li, ei},[ 0,1] such that these choices
are optimal given the price level, and the price level clears the market.
Note that eFB does not depend on A-. The optimal balance between hiring another worker
and increasing the amount of effort that existing workers exert is analogous to the intensive and
extensive margins of labor demand. Equilibrium total factor productivity for a firm with potential
A. is given by
TFPI = - Ai (eFB)O.
This implies the following.
Proposition 1.2 In the complete contracts model, a firm's equilibrium total factor productivity
depends only on that firm's productivity potential, Aj, and the first-best level of effort, eFB
This proposition will stand in contrast to the results from the following section, where effort is
not directly contractible.
1.4 Relational Incentive Contracts
We now turn to the heart of the model and assume that pif = 0 for all ejte. Effort is non-
contractible, and therefore sitt is constant. The principal would like to incentivize her agents to
exert effort, but she can only do so by making a promise that she will pay a pre-specified bonus
if the agent chooses a particular effort level. The principal cannot commit to doing so, so in a
one-shot game, after the agent's effort has been sunk, the principal would always prefer not to pay
the bonus, and thus, a forward-looking agent will not choose a positive effort level. However, the
principal may use future competitive rents as a partial commitment device.
Her ability to do so depends on the clarity with which her failure to pay bonuses gets commu-
nicated to her current and potential future agents, and it also depends on the ease with which she
can replace her current agents. Throughout, I make the following strong assumptions of perfect
observability and no labor market frictions.
Assumption 2. A firm's current workforce and its potential future workforce commonly
observe the effort choices of individual workers and whether or not they were paid their promised
bonuses.
Assumption 3. Workers can be rematched with a different firm at no cost.
Assumption 3 implies that quasi-rents are equal to competitive rents, and Assumption 2 ensures
that the totality of a firm's future competitive rents can be used as collateral in its promises.
Relaxing Assumption 2 to the case of imperfect public monitoring makes the goal of dynamic
enforcement more difficult to achieve but does not qualitatively change any of the results (see
Levin (2003))." Relaxing Assumption 3 allows labor market frictions in addition to competitive
rents to be leveraged in dynamic enforcement. This is the basis for the Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984)
observation that equilibrium unemployment can serve as a worker discipline device.
1.4.1 Dynamic Enforcement
Under what conditions can the agents "trust" the principal to pay the promised bonus? Working
backwards, under what conditions will the agent choose a proposed effort level ete? Throughout,
we will look for equilibria in trigger strategies, which in this game constitute an optimal penal code
(see Abreu 1988). This will be made more precise below.
Suppose agent f believes the principal will pay bonus bite if and only if he chooses effort este = eite.
Then he will choose 6ite (instead of e=te 0, which minimizes his private costs of effort) if
bite + rUi,t+1,e - Ui,t+1,e) c (ete), (1.2)1 + r ()-(if
where Ui,t+,,e is the continuation utility agent f receives from t + 1 on if the relationship is not
terminated, and Ui,t+1,f is the continuation utility the agent he receives if separation occurs. Thus,
he will choose the proposed effort level if and only if the sum of the bonus and the change in the
continuation values exceeds the cost of effort provision.
If the agent chooses any effort level other than the proposed effort level, the principal has no
incentive to pay the bonus and therefore will not. If the agent chooses the proposed effort level ete,
the principal will pay the promised bonus bite if
1
fli,t+1,f - fli,t+i,f) > bite, (1.3)1 + r
where Hi,t+1,e and ij,t+1 ,e are, respectively, the profits generated by the continuing relationship
between the firm and worker f from t + 1 on and the profits generated if the firm and worker f
separate at t + 1. Thus, the change in continuation value for the firm (i.e. the surplus generated
"Ghosh and Ray (1996) and Kranton (1996) show that relaxing the observability assumption with respect to future
potential agents can lead to interesting relationship dynamics.
by the firm's relationship with worker f) must exceed the size of the promised bonus.
We know from MacLeod and Malcomson (1989) and Levin (2003) that (1.2) and (1.3) can be
pooled together to provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the agent to choose the proposed
effort level and the principal to pay the promised bonus. That is, if we let Si,t+i.e = Ui,t+1,+U-Hi,t+1,e
and S Ui,t+1,e+ Ui,t+1,e, we need that
(Si,t+i,e - 5i,t+1,e) ceitf (1.4)1 + r
is satisfied. Si,t+,,e is not a straightforward object. After terminating a relationship with worker
f, the firm would in principle find it optimal to alter its promises to other workers, and the con-
tinuation value that results for the firm then depends on its relationships with its other workers.
As in Levin (2002) and Bernheim and Whinston (1990), however, the firm always does best if it
uses a multilateral relational contract, in which case the continuation strategy following either an
inappropriate effort level or the failure of the principal to pay a bonus to a worker involves all
current and future agents to exert zero effort, the principal to not pay promised bonuses, agents
to reject the relational contract, and the principal not to pay the fixed cost of production. This
allows us to focus only on the aggregate reneging temptation, which can be expressed as
1 ) -Lit
S Sit+1 - 54t41 0 ceitid, (1.5)
where Si,t+1 represents the total variable profits generated by the principal and the agents she hires
net of their outside oppotunities, and Si,t+1 is the firm's outside option. Since the stage game has
an equilibrium in which agents reject any contract they are offered, they choose zero effort if they
do work, the principal does not pay any bonuses, and the principal instead scraps the firm, we can
use this equilibrium as the worst possible punishment. By Abreu (1988), this will form the basis
of an optimal penal code, and thus 5t+ = F.
The remaining object to pin down in (1.5) is Si,t+1, which is the expected net present value of
future competitive rents. This depends on the whole future stream of prices and future promises.
Given a conjecture {p,}'t that is shared by the principal and the agents, Sit+ 1 is given by
0o T -t-1 
-Lit 1-a-6 j-Lit -ef-F
1 ) TAiKiT (eit) 1-O -9d - RKiT - WL, - celTdC - Fj
(=t+1.
(1.6)
{pT}p t are determined jointly by the production capabilities and relational contracts of all the
firms in the economy as well as demand conditions.
1.4.2 Rational Expectations Equilibrium
Throughout, we will focus on rational expectations equilibria in which all firms conjectured the
same price sequence, and this price sequence in fact clears the market in each period. Because it
is not essential for the model, assume the capital market is perfectly competitive, and the interest
rate sequence is pinned down by a consumer Euler equation.
Definition 1.1 A rational-expectations equilibrium (REE) is a sequence of prices {pt };, a
sequence of capital and labor choices {Lit, Kut}, a sequence of relational contracts {sua, bite, eit}i,
and a sequence of effort choices {&te}ut such that at each time t
1. Given promised bonus bit, worker f for firm i optimally chooses effort level et = ent
2. Given the conjectured price sequence { pt }I 1 , firm i optimally offers relational contract {s t, b e
and chooses capital and labor levels { Kte, Lit
3. {pt} * 1 clears the output market for all t
Throughout, I will focus instead on stationary REEs with constant prices pt = p. The
following proposition establishes existence a unique stationary REE.12
Proposition 1.3 Suppose D is smooth and satisfies limp-o D (p) = oc, D' < 0, and suppose G is
absolutely continuous. There exists a unique stationary REE.
Proof. Suppose all firms conjecture price sequence pt = p for all t. Fix a firm i and as-
sume all other firms use a stationary relational contract (sjte, bt, ejtt) = (sjf, by, eje) and choose
constant capital and labor levels (Kjt, Ljt) = (Kj, Lj). Then from firm i's perspective, the en-
vironment is stationary. Suppose firm i chooses (Kit, Lit) = (Ki, Li) for all t. By Levin (2003),
firm i can replicate any optimal relational contract with a stationary relational contract. Thus,
"In a related model, I have shown that there may exist a nonstationary REE with price cycles. The basic intuition
is the following. Suppose all firms believe that output prices will be high and then low and then high and so forth.
Then from the perspective of a period in which prices are high, the future looks relatively grim, as prices will be low
in the future. This constrains the level of effort firms can sustain as part of an optimal relational contract today,
which leads to a restriction in quantity and hence a high price today. From tomorrow's perspective, future prices will
be high, and thus the firm's competitive rents are sufficient for sustaining high levels of effort. Quantity is high and
therefore prices are low. Thus, this two-point alternating price sequence is consistent with equilibrium.
(site, bitf, elte) = (sit, bit, ed), which in turn makes the firm's choice of a constant capital and labor
sequence optimal. This implies a constant aggregate production sequence, so that pt = p if such a
price exists.
Aggregate supply is upward-sloping, since future competitive rents, and hence today's output, are
increasing in p for all firms. Further, it is smooth, since G is absolutely continuous. Since aggregate
demand has an infinite choke price and is decreasing and smooth, existence and uniqueness of such
a price p follows. a
1.4.3 Optimal Relational Incentive Contracts
The remaining sections characterize optimal relational contracts in the stationary REE and examine
the aggregate implications of the dynamic enforcement constraint. We know from the previous
proposition that in the steady state, it is an equilibrium for firms to choose stationary relational
contracts. By Assumption 1, production is concave in individual effort choices. Since workers are
symmetric, any optimal relational contract will involve e = ei for all f. At the steady state, per
period profits for firm i are given by
,r pAieK L 0 -RKi-(W+cei)L -F.
In an optimal relational contract, firms maximize their per-period profits subject to their pooled






In the formulation of the production function, I have assumed that if all workers choose the
same effort levels, production exhibits decreasing returns to scale in K and L. This is a standard
assumption in models in which firms of different productivities co-exist in equilibrium (e.g. Lucas
(1978)). Alternatively, the entire model can be reformulated as a monopolistic competition model
in which each firm's production exhibits constant returns to scale in K and L, but each firm faces a
downward-sloping demand curve (see Appendix B). I show in Appendix A that if revenues exhibit
constant returns in K and L, there is no competitive equilibrium.
We can think of the interest rate the firm faces as an effective interest rate that combines firm
turnover (i.e. an exogenous probability of firm destruction), pure time preferences, monitoring
technology on the part of the firm (i.e. can the firm see whether or not a worker has chosen the
correct effort level?) or on the part of the population of workers (i.e. can future workers see if the
firm has paid the bonuses?). In other words, think of r as fairly large.
The next proposition characterizes the solution to the constrained problem (1.7) subject to
(1.8).
Proposition 1.4 In this model, the solution to the constrained problem satisfies
e* (A) L* (A) 
_K* (A) *(A),
eFB LFB (Ai) KFB(A,)
where 0 < p* (Ai) < 1 is (weakly) increasing in p and (weakly) decreasing in R, W, and r. Further,
if we define
AL (1 + r)O As
AH (1 - r) As r <
+oo r >1
then
1 Ai 2 AH
p* ( {A) = - + (1 - (AL/Ai)1/2 AL A < AH
0 A< AL.
This proposition is proven in the appendix. The following figure characterizes this solution as a
function of A. In the complete contracts model, e* (A,) equals zero if Ai is not large enough for the
firm to cover its fixed costs of production and e* (Ai) = eFB otherwise. When formal contracts are
unavailable, there are three additional regions. For As < Ai < AL, the firm should produce but
is unable to. For AL < Ai < AH, the dynamic enforcement constraint is binding, and the firm is
unable to produce efficiently. For At 2 AH, the firm is unconstrained and thus produces according
to first-best.






Figure 2: Equilibrium and FB Effort
Equilibrium total factor productivity for a firm with potential Ai is then
TFP = = Aip* (Ai) 0 (eFB).
This leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 1.5 In the relational contracting model, a firm's equilibrium total factor productivity
depends on the firm's productivity potential as well as its sustainable effort-level, which is increasing
in p and decreasing in R, W, and r.
A firm's total factor productivity depends on the effective discount rate a firm faces and is
therefore decreasing in firm turnover and increasing in the clarity with which deviations are com-
municated. The quality of communication technology and the strength of social connections may
therefore play a role in determining a firm's total factor productivity. In addition, total factor
productivity is jointly determined with the equilibrium price-a firm's production possibilities set
is endogenous to market conditions, unlike in the standard Neoclassical growth model.
1.5 Aggregate Implications of this Approach
The first set of implications concerns the impact of relational solutions to contractual incompleteness
on the allocational efficiency of production in an economy. I show that firms do not produce up
until the point where the net marginal revenue product of labor (MRPL - W) is zero; further,
heterogeneity in productivity potential leads to heterogeneity in net marginal revenue product of
labor. Additionally, I provide a simple characterization for aggregate TFP.
I then compare two otherwise identical economies: one with noncontractible effort, the other
with perfectly contractible effort. Holding prices constant, allowing for perfectly contractible effort
has two effects. First, TFP rises more for firms that are more constrained, leading to a compression
of the TFP distribution for existing firms. Second, lower-potential firms that were previously unable
to produce now do so. Since allowing for complete contracts increases production for a given price,
the equilibrium output price will fall. This leads to a contraction of output in more productive
firms and increases the minimum scale necessary for production. The net effect is a compression of
output. I confirm these findings numerically.
1.5.1 Aggregate TFP and Misallocation
Restuccia and Rogerson (2008) and Hsieh and Klenow (2009) are agnostic about the mechanism
behing the misallocation of capital and labor in an economy. This misallocation is modeled as
resulting from labor and capital wedges in a firm's first-order conditions-different firms have
different net marginal revenue products of labor and capital in equilibrium. In this model, firms
equate the net marginal revenue product of capital to zero; however, they face heterogeneous
distortions on the labor margin.
To see this, note that at the constrained optimum, the ratio of labor, capital, and effort to their
first-best levels are identical, and therefore their ratios are the same as the first-best ratios-firms
that do not achieve first-best still nevertheless have the same capital/labor and output/labor ratios
as firms that are unconstrained. However, since more constrained firms demand less effort from
their workers, in equilibrium, they pay lower wages. Thus, their labor share of total revenues is
lower than at the first best. Firms in this economy thus tend to be suboptimally small. This is
reflected by a disparity between the marginal revenue product of labor and the effective wages a
firm pays a worker, W* (A) = W + ce* (Ai). To see this, note that at the optimum,
MRPL (Ai) - W* (A) = (1 - * (As)) ceFB
An unconstrained firm should equalize the marginal revenue product of labor to the wage rate,
which is indeed the case when p* = 1. The more constrained a firm is (as measured by a lower p*),
the greater is the disparity between the marginal revenue product of labor and its compensation.
Such firms would like to expand, but are unable to.
What are the implications of this for aggregate total factor productivity? Let YAGG _fy
where y* is firm i's per-period production under its optimal relational contract, and let KAGG _
J K2fdi and LAGG f L di, where Kl and L* are, respectively, firm i's capital and labor de-
mands in the optimal relational contract. Aggregate TFP is then aggregate output divided by an
appropriately weighted measure of aggregate observable inputs, or
TFPAGG YAGG 0 FB 0) AJ1/p* (A) dG (A)
(KAGG)" LAGG)la
Af_ A( () A)
= TFPjG w (A) p* (A) dG(A)
where TFPAG is the aggregate TFP that would arise if effort were perfectly contractible, and
w(A) - A/ 0GA
Aggregate inefficiencies are a weighted average of firm-level inefficiencies, and thus factors that
determine the efficiency of production in individual firms also determine the efficiency of aggregate
production. These include endogenous objects such as output prices, and exogenous objects such as
the importance of effort in production (0), and the firm's effective interest rate, which is composed
of a time-preference parameter, the rate of turnover, and measures of the underlying monitoring
structure.
In what sense is this economy inefficient? Obviously, a social planner that need not respect
dynamic enforcement constraints (say by directly choosing effort) can achieve more output for
the same level of input. Suppose instead that a social planner can reallocate competitive rents,
keeping their sum equal to the aggregate competitive rents, through fixed cost subsidies and taxes.
Then a reduction in competitive rents of an unconstrained firm (by marginally increasing its fixed
costs) leads to no reduction in its output; if these rents are reallocated to a constrained firm (by
marginally reducing its fixed costs), they increase its output in proportion to the shadow cost of its
dynamic enforcement constraint. When contracts are incomplete, and there is limited commitment
to promised contingent compensation, the price mechanism need not allocate competitive rents
efficiently.
1.5.2 Differences in Formal Contracting Institutions
Suppose there are two countries, comp and inc. In country comp, firms have no access to useful
verifiable performance measures (so that ptf = 0), while in country inc, firms have access to perfect
verifiable performance measures (so that pite = e We).1 4 The two countries are otherwise identical,
in the sense that firms in the two countries face the same aggregate demand curve D (.), the same
interest and rental rates (r and R, respectively), workers have the same outside options (W), and
productivity potential is drawn from the same distribution G. Assume throughout that the two
countries do not trade with each other.
In country inc, low-potential (low A) firms are more constrained. To see this, recall that for
a firm with potential A, if this firm operated in country inc, its TFP would be TFPinc (A)
AP* (A) 0 (eFB)0 , and if it operated in country comp, its TFP would be TFPcmP (A) = A (eFB)0 .
For such a firm, the ratio of these two values is TFP=nc(A p* (A) < 1, which is increasing in A.TFP-mP( A)
Superior contracting institutions disproportionately improves effort provision in such firms and may
lead to a compression in productivity by thinning out the left tail of the distribution of productivity.
This is consistent with the idea that countries with better contracting institutions (i.e. the US)
tend to have relatively fewer firms operating in the left tail of the productivity distribution than
countries with worse contracting institutions (i.e. China or India). I simulate the ns = 1, 000, 000
firms in a model with the a= 0.45,0 = 0.25,W = 0.5,R = 0.45,'r = 0.8,c= 1, logA N (1, 4),
F = 2.7, D (p) = p 1/5. The productivity distribution for firms in the two economies is shown in
figure 3.
14 A richer model would allow for a more subtle comparison. For example, countries could perhaps be indexed by
W E [0, 1], where firms in a country with index w have access to a performance measure pite 1 {e e ;> weFB}. In
this case, high-quality (but imperfect) formal contracts may undermine relational incentives, as in Baker, Gibbons,
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Figure 3: Productivity Dispersion
std(log TFPnC)
Total factor productivity is more compressed in comp than in inc: sd(log TFPomP) 1.3. Differences
in contracting institutions across countries can partially explain differences in the dispersion of total
factor productivity, as documented by Hsieh and Klenow (2009) in Table 1.
Table 1: Dispersion in log TFP
Hsieh-Klenow China (1998) India (1994) US (1997)
Olog TFP 1.06 1.23 0.84
However, since each firm in country comp will produce more than its counterpart in country inc,
aggregate supply will be greater for a given price level. Since in both countries, aggregate demand
is the same, this implies lower output prices in country comp.Figure 3 shows that the equilibrium
output price is p flc = 0.7525 in country inc and pc"m P = 0.6758 in country comp. Since r < 1,
AH < oc, there will be some firms in country inc that have sufficiently high potential that they
are not constrained in equilibrium. Because of this difference in prices, such high-potential firms
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Figure 4: Aggregate Supply and Demand
In particular, there will be some level of potential, A, such that for A < A, output for a firm in
comp will be greater than its counterpart in inc, and for A > A, output will be greater in inc
than in comp. This is shown in Figure 5. For these parameter values, we will have A'"" = 3.8,
A' ""1 = 4.3, Ai"c = 4.4, and Ain=5.7.
* Partial Eqbm
o General Eqbm




The thin lines represent the differences between production in inc and comp holding output prices
constant at pi"C. That is, the thin line represents the differences in production that result solely
from a difference in the contracting environment. For A < Age, firms do not earn enough to cover
their fixed costs of production and therefore should not produce in either country. Firms with
Ac < A < AyJc are unable to produce using only relational contracts but if perfect contracts
are available, they will earn enough to cover their fixed costs. Firms with A)"C < A < Agnc are
constrained and thus produce more in comp than in inc, though this difference is smaller the greater
is A. Finally, firms with A > Ag' are unconstrained in either economy and therefore produce the
same amount.
The thick lines compare equilibria in the two countries by accounting for differences in the price
level. Firms with ACnc < A < Acom are able to cover their fixed costs under the higher price level,
pi"c , but not under the lower price level in comp. Only those firms with A' 0"I < A < A)"c are
present in comp but not in inc. For firms with A > A}C, there are two effects-perfect formal
contracts allows for more effort provision, but lower prices leads to less desired production. The
net effect of these two effects gives rise to a cutoff A such that A)" < A < A firms produce more
and A < A firms produce less in comp than in inc.
Taking output to be a measure of firm size, we can see that there will be greater dispersion in
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1.6 Conclusion
Expanding an organization requires making promises. Using the logic of relational contracting
models, I show that a firm's potential competitive rents can be used as collateral in these promises.
However, the returns to expansion are decreasing, while the aggregate promises a firm must make
in order to sustain expansion grow linearly in the size of the firm. This implies that in the steady
state, some firms may wish to expand but are unable to do so. Lack of trust in organizations thus
leads to a persistent cap on firm size.
This has implications for the allocation of productive resources in an economy. Relative to an
economy with perfect formal contracts, an economy in which firms must rely solely on relational
contracts will be characterized by a thick left tail of fairly unproductive firms. Output prices will
be higher, and this will lead to a greater dispersion in the size of firms. Some firms will be "too
large" and others will be "too small."
There are several potential avenues for future research. Since the model focuses on the steady
state, it is silent about the growth path of individual firms. If we view firm growth as being made
possible only by non-contractible investments from employees of a firm, then the rate at which a
firm grows may be limited by the potential productivity of a firm. In particular, it may be that
there is a critical level of potential productivity A such that firms with productivity A < A face
extremely sluggish growth (or perhaps none at all) and firms with productivity A > A are able
to grow significantly faster. Such a model may be able to generate results consistent with the new
Hsieh and Klenow (2011) facts on firm growth.
This model could also be embedded into a Melitz (2003) style international trade model to
explore the effects of trade liberalization on individual firm TFP. There would be a market expansion
effect for exporting firms, and the increased competitive rents this would imply could lead to
increased effort provision within the firm. On the other hand, the decreased price level that would
result could negatively impact the productivity of firms that do not export. The net welfare
consequences of these two effects is ambiguous. These effects would complement the reallocation
effects of Melitz.
1.7 Appendix A: Proofs and Derivations
Proposition 1.6 If production exhibits constant returns to scale in labor and capital, there does
not exist an REE.
Proof. Suppose production is y-t (eit, Kit, Lit) = AiejtKaLi-7 . Then, in period t, the firm
with the highest value of A- will continue to produce as long as pty-t - RtKit - (W + cet) Lit > 0.
Market clearing with finite demand thus implies that ptyit - RtKit - (W + cet) L = 0 for all t.
This in turn implies that the left-hand side of the dynamic enforcement constraint is zero, which
implies that no production can be sustained. m
Proposition 1.7 Suppose with probability qp, deviations by the principal go unnoticed by future
potential agents, and with probability qA, deviations by an agent go unnoticed by the principal. Then
the effective interest rate in (1.8) is r = .'
Proof. If we rewrite (1.2) and (1.3) recognizing that (a) the principal will choose st to pin each
agent to his (IR) constraint and that (b) the optimal relational contract will be stationary, and we
introduce qA, qB > 0, these become




If we pool these across agents, this becomes
7ri1
qp- > b.> -Lce
r qA
or 7i > Lice -rLice, which is the desired result. m
Proposition 1.8 In this model, the solution to the constrained problem satisfies
e* (A) _ L* (A) K* (A) ,
eFB LFB (A) KFB(A)
where 0 < P* (A) < 1 is (weakly) increasing in p and (weakly) decreasing in R, W, and r. Further,
1 A AH
p (A)= I + (I - (AL/A)1/) AL A < AH
0 A< AL,
where
AL FO c R * W 1-a-20A =a -- (1+r)2
AH F 1 c R W )1--2
Proof. Throughout this proof, I drop the i subscript for the firm. Proposition 3 allows us to
focus on the stationary problem. Worker symmetry and decreasing returns to effort imply that
ef= e for all f E [0, LI. The firm's problem is then
max pAeOK"L1-O - RK - (W + ce) L - F
K,L,e
subject to
pAeK"L1-"- - RK - (W + ce) L - F > rLce.
Since an increase in K increases the objective function as well as the left-hand side of the constraint,
capital will be chosen efficiently, given L and e. Define
7 (K* (L, e), L, e) = py (K* (L, e), L, e) - RK* (L, e) - (W + cc) L - F.
The firm's problem is then to max7r (K* (L, e) , L, e) subject to -r (K* (L, e) , L, e) > rLce. Suppose
the firm is constrained at the optimum. Define L (e) such that the constraint holds with equality.
The unconstrained problem is then
max rL (e) ce.
e
Taking first-order conditions, the firm chooses e such that Le = -1. Implicitly differentiating
the constraint with respect to e and substituting this into the first-order condition yields
py (K*, L*, e*) - RK* 1- a
L* (1.9)
and we know from the constraint that
py (K*, L*,e*) - RK* F
L* =(W + (1 + r) ce*) + L* . (1.10)
(1.9) implies
L* (e*) =(pA); - e*( W (R)
and substituting this into (1.10), we have that e* solves a quadratic equation. The linearity of
L* (e*) results from the assumptions that production is constant returns to scale in (K, L, e) and
effort costs are linear in e. Without this assumption, e* would then be the solution to a nonlinear
equation. If we define AL as in the statement of the proposition, the solution to this quadratic
equation is
*= (1+ (1 - (AL/A)1/ -/)
+ r)
Optimal labor and capital are linear in e*. It is then easy to show that the constraint is binding
for A < AH. For A > AH, the solution to the constrained problem is the same as the solution to
the unconstrained problem. m
1.8 Appendix B: Monopolistic Competition Version
In this appendix, I show that this model can be equivalently formulated as a monopolistic compe-
tition model in which production exhibits constant returns to scale in capital and labor. Under a
restriction on the effort cost function, total factor revenue product, (TFPR = p - A), is equated
across firms, as in Hsieh and Klenow. Higher productivity firms produce more and therefore have
lower output prices. Distortions in the allocation of productive resources across firms can then be




where - E [0, 1] is a measure of the elasticity of demand. The inverse demand is then p =
M-"q-(1-') and thus revenues are given by
R = pq = 1-"q"
where M is a function of market size and the price aggregate. Per-period profits are then
7r = 1-"q" - RK - (W +c (e)) L
where q = AeOKaL . Define 0 = o-, a =&-, 3=#a, and normalize effort so that 0 + a +
1 = ( -a + -+ Then, assume c (e) ce, which is not without loss of generality. Per-period
profits become
, = 1-"r (AeKdL/) - RK - (W + ce) L
= Me 0 K"L-"~ - RK - (W + ce) L




1 - a - 20 c
LF(M) 0RW l-a
LFB~-+ (M k1 - a, - 20 0 g
ck+O /\1-7k--
KFB (M) = MF "B" 1ja -2 )
TFPR is then
TFPR = pA = $- = K)- "S
q
TFPR is thus independent of A if and only if & + / = 1, that is, if production exhibits constant
returns to scale in capital and labor, then TFPR is independent of A. This restriction amounts to
1 ~ ~ =(& )
or 0 = > 0.
1.9 Appendix C: Free Entry
In the main text of the paper, I have assumed that there is a mass N = 1 of firms. This appendix
follows Hopenhayn (1992) in endogenizing the mass of firms in the economy. Suppose there is a
period 0 at which a firm can pay a cost F' to enter the economy and take a productivity potential
draw A ~ G (A). Throughout, I will focus on the stationary REE. Suppose a mass N of firms has
entered. Aggregate supply in each period as a function of the steady state price level p is given by
1-a-O
1- w1 - o - 20 ( i'eFB
S(p;N) 
-p - 2 e)
Ap011* (A;p) dG (A),
where I have made the dependence of p on p explicit. Note that AL (p) is decreasing in p and p is
increasing in p, so S (p; N) is increasing in p. Demand is stationary and given by D (p), which is
smooth, downward-sloping, and satisfies limpo D (p) = o. The unique equilibrium price p* (N)
thus solves
S (p* (N) ; N) = D (p* (N)) .
Define first-best gross profits for a firm with productivity potential A as
)1-a-o0a I 1- ae - 20 )Wgross (A; p) = 0 (pA)i eFB R W
Net profits can be shown to be
7r (A; p) = max{ p* (A; p) (2 - p* (A; p)) Wgross (A; p) - F, .
Expected gross profits are given by
Tr(p)= JT(A;p)dG(A)
The free entry condition is then given by
F, (p)Fe=
r
Since D is downward-sloping and S is increasing in p and N, p* (N) is decreasing in N. The
free entry condition pins down N by -r (p* (N)) - rFe = 0. Since -r is increasing in p, this is
monotonically decreasing in N. Since the choke price is infinity, we will have that r (p* (0)) > rFe.
As long as -r (p* (N < rFe for some N large, there will be a unique value N* that satisfies the
free entry condition.
Chapter 2
Influence-Cost Models of Firm
Boundaries and Structures
2.1 Introduction
This chapter explores the organizational implications of influence activities-costly activities aimed
at persuading a decision maker-both within and between firms. Such activities are commonplace in
business relationships. Employees may devote a significant fraction of their otherwise-productive
time building their credentials and seeking outside opportunities to convince management that
they are ideal for promotion to a key position (Milgrom and Roberts 1988). Division managers
may lobby corporate headquarters for larger budgets to pursue pet projects (Wulf 2009). Buyers
of intermediate goods may try to persuade sellers to provide favorable delivery time slots, to give
them first pick of the highest quality batches of goods, or to assign specific personnel to their case.
Such activities are often privately costly and can lower the quality of decision making, and thus
part of the organizational design problem is aimed at mitigating them.
Organizations often adopt rigid practices that seem inefficient from a neoclassical perspective
but can make sense from the viewpoint of reducing influence activities. A seniority-based promo-
tion rule can sometimes promote a less talented worker or one who is not a good fit for the new
position, but it effectively reduces the incentives for workers to waste time "buttering up the boss"
(Milgrom 1988; Milgrom and Roberts 1988). Low-powered managerial incentives can stifle moti-
vation but can help reduce an own-division bias in lobbying for corporate resources. Closed-door
organizational practices that hamper communication can make it difficult to implement continuous
quality improvement initiatives, but a more open policy may invite lobbying. Moreover, as Milgrom
and Roberts (1990) point out, "even the very boundaries of the firm can become design variables."
That is, divesting a business unit can create barriers to influence (Meyer, Milgrom, and Roberts
1992). Influence activities are not absent between firms, however-many business relationships are
on-going and involve significant relationship specificity, and hence a firm does care about (and thus
may hope to influence) what its business partners do.1
This paper seeks to provide a unified theory of the costs and benefits of integration that is
based on the logic of influence-activity mitigation. In order to do so, I embed a tractable model of
influence activities it into an organizational design problem. As in Grossman and Hart (1986) and
Hart and Moore (1990), this is carried out under a common economic environment (i.e. preferences,
information structure, contracting possibilities, and decision sets do not exogenously vary with the
control structure). In a model with two decision rights, integration is unified control and non-
integration is divided control. The tractability of this approach allows me to explore the impacts of
alternative mechanisms for influence-activity mitigation, such as those described above, and their
interaction with control structures.
To ground ideas, suppose two parties are in a working relationship. Contracts are incomplete-
the parties are unable to meet ex ante and specify a complete state-contingent decision rule-and,
in the course of their relationship, decisions must be taken. The rights to make these decisions are
contractible ex ante, but neither the rights to make decisions nor the actual decisions to be made
are contractible ex post.2 That is, when a particular contingency arises, the interested parties
cannot costlessly meet and efficiently bargain over the decision that is to be taken. Control is
thus exercised-the party with the control right unilaterally chooses his ideal decision given his
information. Additionally, there are decision externalities -each party cares directly about the
decisions the other party makes.
Finally, information regarding the ideal decision is most easily discernible by the parties who
care about the decision to be taken. As such, a decision maker must often rely on reports and
messages that originate from parties who have a direct interest in altering the decision maker's
beliefs and the ability to do so. The party may seek out additional information that favors his view,
As Williamson (1971) and Klein, Crawford, and Alchian (1978) emphasize, even in a perfectly competitive
environment for homogeneous intermediate goods, the fundamental transformation ensures that firm boundaries do
not eliminate all externalities between parties involved in a transaction.
2 Aghion and Tirole (1997), Alonso, Dessein and Matouschek (2008), Rantakari (2008), and to a lesser extent, Hart
and Moore (2008), Hart (2009), Hart (2010), feature ex-post noncontractibility.
he may neglect to mention certain points that do not, or he may attempt to tell a story consistent
with the facts but heavily biased in its conclusion. In any case, crafting such an argument takes
time that would be better spent on more productive tasks-the direct cost of influence activities is
the opportunity cost of the influencer's time. As such, these costs are convex-engaging in influence
activities crowds out less productive tasks before more productive tasks. Of course, the decision
maker recognizes that the influencer has the incentive to manipulate information in this way and
will take this into account when making a decision. Nevertheless, following the logic of Holmstrom
(1999), equilibrium may involve non-zero levels of influence activities, for if the decision maker
anticipated none, the influencer would have the incentive to carry out some.
The model shows that for a fixed control structure, the equilibrium level of influence activities
a party engages in is greater the greater is (a) his concern for the decisions being made, (b) the
degree of ex post disagreement, (c) the effectiveness with which beliefs can be manipulated, and
(d) the number of decisions not under his control. The last point implies that, all else equal, di-
viding control reduces the costs of influence activities: divided control leads both parties to crowd
out mundane activities, whereas concentrated control leads one party to essentially specialize in
influence activities, crowding out potentially important tasks. Parties operating in volatile environ-
ments in which beliefs are highly sensitive to manipulable information should thus perhaps become
non-integrated.
On the other hand, there may be benefits to concentrating control: coordinating the two deci-
sions could be important, or one party might simply have more to lose from not having his ideal
decision implemented. The parties may thus opt for integration and choose to reduce influence
activities using alternative instruments, such as closed-door policies or restrictions on the discre-
tion of the decision maker. Influence-cost theory can thus help shed light on why certain puzzling
management practices persist (as documented by Bloom and Van Reenen (2007)) and can provide
a selection-based, rather than causal, explanation for their finding of a positive correlation between
the quality of management practices and plant-level performance. Further, the theory predicts
interactions between boundaries and organizational practices: rigid organizational practices and
integration are complementary. Non-integrated relationships should be governed by less restrictive
rules than relationships within integrated firms.
While the analysis above pertains to the boundaries of the firm, similar insights apply to control
structures within firms. In the coordination versus local adaptation framework of the recent papers
by Alonso, Dessein, and Matouschek (2008) and Rantakari (2008), I derive a similar trade-off.
Centralizing control with a third-party headquarters facilitates coordination, but it does so at the
expense of high levels of influence activities. Decentralization hampers coordination and reduces
influence activities. As in the baseline model, centralization and rigid organizational practices
are complementary. This is consistent with the (Bloom, Sadun, and Van Reenen 2011) findings of
positive correlations between decentralization and the quality of management practices and between
decentralization and firm performance.
My analysis assumes that information-gathering activities are separable from influence activi-
ties, which I define to be (weakly) information degrading. All else equal, an organization may like to
incentivize information acquisition (see Zermeno (2011) for recent work on motivating information
acquisition by an unbiased expert) and discourage influence activities. But the two need not be
separable, and thus I am ruling out potentially beneficial effects of influence activities-since an
individual must be credible to be persuasive, he must gather useful information in order to influence
a decision maker (see Laux (2008) for recent work along these lines).
This paper is related to the literature on influence activities in organizations (Milgrom 1988;
Milgrom and Roberts 1988, 1990, 1992; Schaefer 1998; Scharfstein and Stein 2000; Laux 2008; Wulf
2009; Friebel and Raith 2010; Lachowski (2011)) but is closest in spirit to Meyer, Milgrom, and
Roberts (1992) who explore the idea that the boundaries of the firm can serve as design variables
to mitigate influence activities. The key difference is that in their model, divestiture of a division is
equivalent to assuming that decision rules cannot depend on the information the division possesses,
whereas in my model, divestiture of a division amounts to divided control. I view informational
restrictions on decision rules as an additional instrument (as in Milgrom and Roberts (1988)) and
analyze the interaction between the two. It is closest in analysis to Gibbons (2005) who explores
the role of the allocation of a single decision right on equilibrium influence activities. This paper
goes farther in that it analyzes the simultaneous choice of boundaries and organizational practices.
In doing so, it provides a theory of the firm based on ex post inefficiencies (Matouschek 2004;
Hart and Holmstrom 2010) that is related to Williamson's classic "haggling" versus "fiat" argu-
ment. My treatment of rigid organizational practices is also related to the literature on endogenous
bureaucracy (e.g. Prendergast (2003)).
Section 2 develops a simple model of the allocation of control in the presence of influence
activities. Section 3 defines and characterizes the equilibrium of this influence activity model
for a fixed governance structure, and sections 4-6 endogenize the governance structure. Section
4 analyzes the optimal allocation of control (control structure) for a fixed set of organizational
practices, section 5 analyzes organizational practices for a fixed control structure, and section 6
examines the optimal choice of both. Section 7 shows that similar logic can also form the basis
for a theory of the internal structure of decision making rather than boundaries, and section 8
concludes.
2.2 The Model
There are two managers, denoted by L and R and two decisions that must be made, di and d2 . The
payoffs to the managers for a particular decision depend on an underlying state of the world, denoted
by s E S. The state of the world is unobserved; however, the two managers can commonly observe
an informative signal, a. But, as Milgrom and Roberts (1988) point out, information regarding the
ideal decision typically originates with the parties who care about the ultimate decisions taken3
and have the means to misrepresent the information. As a result, the signal can be manipulated
by both managers in a way that will be made precise shortly.
For example, the two managers may make use of a common asset such as the reputation of
the final product that emerges from their production process. The upstream manager may prefer
that the reputation be geared toward showcasing the durability of the inputs. The downstream
manager may prefer that it emphasize novelty. Decisions must be made regarding the direction
to emphasize. Both managers want the final product to succeed, and success largely depends on
consumers' preferences, which are uncertain. Depending on who is making these decisions, one or
both managers may have the incentive to try to change the other's beliefs by, say, alter the phrasing
of certain questions that are asked in consumer focus groups.
Formally, assume that each manager can choose a level of "influence activities," denoted by
A' E A at private cost k (A'). The private cost represents the opportunity cost of time wasted ma-
nipulating the signal. As such, the costs of influence activities are increasing and convex. Through-
out, I assume that the influence activities are chosen prior to the observation of the public signal
and without any private knowledge of the state of the world, 4 and they affect the conditional distri-
bution of T given s. Further, I assume that this effect is linear.5 After the signal has been observed,
3Throughout, I assume the two parties are "locked in" with each other, regardless of the allocation of control, and
thus each directly care about both decisions. A richer model might allow for endogenous dependence between the
two players. How this interacts with firm boundaries is an interesting question for future research.
1I show in Appendix B that the qualitative results of this model can also be generated as a separating equilibrium
in a noisy signaling game. However, the multiplicity of equilibria in signaling games makes such an approach relatively
unappealing.
5 The assumption that AA and AB do not affect the conditional variance of or s rules out the Milgrom and Roberts
the party(ies) with control of the decision right must immediately choose a decision. There is nei-
ther time nor opportunity for the two parties to get together and bargain over the decision to be
made.6 Further, I assume that the parties cannot bargain over a signal-contingent decision rule ex
ante. 7
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Figure 1: Timing
The timing of the model (shown in figure 1 above) is as follows: (1) L and R bargain over a
control structure g from a set G, which I will describe soon; (2) L and R simultaneously choose
(unobservable) influence activities AL, AR E A C R at cost k (A), where k is convex and symmetric
around zero, with k' (0) = k (0) = 0; (3) i and j publicly observe the signal o = s + A' + Ai + e; (4)
The manager with control chooses decision d E 1R; (5) Payoffs are realized.
Throughout, assume that all random variables are normally distributed (s ~ N (0, h-1), e
N (0, h-1)) and independent, and managers have quadratic costs of influence, k (A) (A')2 and
gross payoffs of the following form
2 ei 
-i 2
U' (s, d) =2 (de - sZ) ,a > 0, /' E R.
Manager i prefers that di = d2  s +02, and hence the two managers disagree on their ideal decision
conditional on the state of the world. The problem is not interesting if #L = OR, so without loss of
generality, assume {L R = A > 0. Two aspects of symmetry have been assumed here. First, the
amount by which manager i cares about how close the decision is to his ideal decision is assumed
to be the same across decisions.8 That is, the a" coefficient on the loss functions for both decisions
(1988) idea that "when... underlying information is so complex that unscrambling is impossible, decision makers will
have to rely on information they know is incomplete or inaccurate." I explore this idea in more detail in Appendix
C.
(5Ex post noncontractibility is a central feature of many recent papers in organizational economics. See footnote
1 for a list of several such papers.
7Appendix C explores related issues of optimal rule design.
'The prospect of influence-activity mitigation provides a force toward divided control. What is important in
generating the trade-off in this model is that the same party who cares more about one decision also cares more
is the same. Secondly, the amount by which the two managers disagree about the ideal decision is
equal across decisions.9 Throughout, assume that aL > aR.
There are four possible allocations of control. Control can be unified and held by either manager
L or manager R or it can be divided. If manager L has control of decision 1, and manager R has
control of decision 2, control is said to be non-integrated. Otherwise, control is reverse non-
integrated." Consistent with many theories of the firm (i.e. the "IO" view, Transaction Cost
Economics, and Property Rights Theory), divided control will be referred to as non-integration
(and will be denote by g = NI) and unified control as integration (g -= I)."
2.3 Equilibrium
Suppose manager i has control of a decision. Manager j cares about the decision to be taken and
recognizes that this decision depends on i's beliefs. Thus, manager j has a direct interest in what
manager i believes and will do whatever is in his power to change i's beliefs. But, as Cyert and
March (1963) argue, "We cannot reasonably introduce the concept of communication bias without
introducing its obvious corollary - 'interpretive adjustment."' That is, manager i recognizes that
manager j has the incentive to influence the signal, and he will correct for this in his beliefs.
As in career-concerns/signal-jamming games, this "interpretive adjustment" does not eliminate the
incentives to carry out influence activities, for if the decision maker expected no influence activities,
then the influencer would have a strong incentive to engage in them. Thus, conditional on a control
structure, g, the solution concept is perfect Bayesian equilibrium, as in career-concerns/signal-
jamming games. Denote manager i's beliefs about the vector of influence activities by A (i).
Definition 2.1 Given a control structure, g, a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of the resulting
game consists of choices of influence activities, A*L and A*R, and a decision function d*9 (o;)
such that: (1) each component of d*9 (6; X) is chosen optimally by the manager who controls that
decision under g, given his beliefs about the state of the world, which depend on conjectures about
about the other. Section 7 explores alternative foundations for the optimality of concentrated control.
'Relaxing this does not qualitatively change any results. Allowing for different A's across decisions simply adjusts
the weights that are placed on each decision in the governance structure choice period.
'At this point, I do not consider the possibility of allocating control to a third party. Section 7 considers this
possibility.
"Though there are four potential allocations of control, only two will ever be optimal: unifying control with
manager L or dividing control by giving decision 1 to L and decision 2 to R. This allows us to avoid introducing
additional notation for the remaining control structures: R-control and reverse non-integration.
the level of influence activities, sj a, A (i); (2) influence activities are chosen optimally given the
allocation of the decision right; and (3) beliefs are correct: A (i) = A*.
Let us begin by solving for an equilibrium for an arbitrary control structure g. Suppose manager
i has control of decision f under governance structure g. Let A* denote the equilibrium level of
influence activities. Manager i will choose d* to minimize his expected loss given his beliefs. Since
he faces a quadratic loss function, his decision will be equal to his conditional expectation of the
state of the world, given the signal and his equilibrium conjecture about influence activities, plus
his bias term, 3* That is,
d*g (o; A*) = Es[s o, A*] +#
The decision manager i chooses differs from the decision manager j # i would choose if he had
the decision right for two reasons. First, #* # # so for a given set of beliefs, manager i prefers a
different level of de than manager j does. Secondly, it may be that, out of equilibrium, beliefs are
incorrect. That is, manager i knows AV but only has a conjecture about A. The normal updating
rule implies that the conditional expectation of the state of the world from the perspective of
individual i is a convex combination of two estimators of the state of the world. The first is the
prior mean, 0, and the second is a modified signal, s (i) = o - A R (i), which must of course
satisfy (i = A'. The weight that i's preferred decision rule attaches to the signal is given by the
signal-to-noise ratio, o h-- . That is
Es [sl , A(i)] = (1 - p) - 0 + - (i).
Given decision rules d* (o; A*) for f = 1, 2, we can now compute the equilibrium level of influence
activities that each manager will engage in. Influence activities for manager j are more privately
beneficial (out of equilibrium) the greater is the difference between the equilibrium decision rule
and manager j's decision rule, the more manager j cares about his loss from having a suboptimal
decision rule, and the more weight the decision maker places on the manipulable signal. Manager
j's level of influence activities will solve
2 od*9 o-
k' (Ai*) - Es,E -ai (dKg7 (o; A*) - s - d) = 1 a , (1)(d9 ~ i) Ocu OA3* jI ~)p
where N-3 is the number of decisions that manager j does not control under governance
structure g. Further, since given any beliefs about A', the unique optimal decision rule of manager
i is a pure strategy, and given that manager i chooses a pure strategy decision rule, there is a
unique value of AJ* satisfying (1). Thus, the pure strategy equilibrium characterized in this section
is the unique equilibrium of this game. 12 These results are captured in the following proposition.
Proposition 2.1 For a given control structure, there exists a unique Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
of the game that follows. Further, in that Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium, the levels of influence
activities are given by a simple formula
where N-J is the number of decisions player j does not control and p hs is the signal-to-noise
ratio.
All else equal, manager j will choose a higher level of influence activities the more disagreement
(A) there is, the more he cares about the decision (ai), and the more informative the signal is (s).
This last comparative static can be decomposed further. o is high the larger is h, (ie. when the
signal is more precise) and the smaller is h (i.e. when there is more ex ante uncertainty). The rest
of this paper will concern itself with alternative methods of mitigating these influence activities.
2.4 The Coasian Program
Property Rights Theory (Grossman and Hart 1986, Hart and Moore 1990, and Hart 1995, hereafter
PRT) is often lauded for its methodological insistence on specifying a contractual environment that
is common across prospective allocations of residual rights of control. In doing so, it is able to
provide a unified description of the costs and benefits of integration without resorting to alternative
explanations for the costs of one governance structure and the benefits of another. However, PRT
assumes ex post efficiency (via Coasian bargaining), instead focusing on how the allocation of
control affects managers' bargaining positions and hence the sensitivity of their expected split of
the surplus to their ex ante investments. While the approach has proven fruitful in a variety of
"2If higher levels of influence activities increases the precision of the signal, there could be multiple pure strategy
equilibria. In this case, if the decision-maker believes that high (low) levels of influence activities have been chosen,
he will place much (little) weight on the signal. This in turn will induce the other manager to choose high (low) levels
of influence activities. This is analogous to the multiplicity argument in Dewatripont, Jewitt, and Tirole (1999).
fields, it has had difficulty confronting the idea that ex post inefficiencies are equally (and perhaps
more) important determinants of firm boundaries, and thus as Hart (2008) points out, "in order
to make progress on the Coasian agenda, we must move away from Coase (1960) and back in the
direction of Coase (1937). We need to bring back haggling costs!" But a satisfactory formalization
of Williamson (1971)'s appealing argument that non-integration may produce "haggling," so that
decision-making by "fiat" under integration may be more efficient has been difficult.' 3 This section
will lay the framework for analyzing a version of the "haggling" versus "fiat" trade-off, but a more
complete analysis is deferred until section 6.
From the perspective of period 1, before AL and AR are chosen, the two managers bargain over a
control structure, 9*, correctly anticipating its effects on equilibrium influence activities (which are
unique, conditional on g) as well as on the equilibrium decision rules. I assume that the managers
can freely make transfers at this stage, so that the governance structure g* will be the solution to
the following Coasian program
max {W (g)} max Ee, U> (s, d9 (o; A*)) k (A*")gEG gCG
iE{L,R}j iC{L,R}
The quadratic loss structure of the problem leads to a mean-variance decomposition of the first
term and thus a simple characterization of W9 as follows
W (g) = - (ADAP + ALIGN (g) + INFL (g)) .
That is, ex ante expected welfare can be decomposed into the sum of three costs: (1) an adaptation
cost that arises from basing decisions on a noisy signal rather than directly on the state of the
world; (2) an alignment cost that is due to the fact that for each decision, one manager will not
be able to implement his ideal decision rule; and (3) an influence-cost component, which can be
interpreted as "haggling costs." The exact expressions for these terms are derived in proposition 7
in the appendix.
The ADAP term does not depend on the control structure, so g is chosen to minimize the
sum of ALIGN (g) and INFL (g). Two polar cases help identify the relevant trade-off for this
"Masten (1986) develops a model based on Tullock (1980) to highlight the costs of divided control but it is silent on
the costs of unified control. Recent work by Hart and Holmstrom (2010) adapts several behavioral elements from Hart
and Moore (2008) and Hart (2009) to argue that different control structures create different feelings of entitlement
and hence different risks that parties will feel "aggrieved" and thus "shade" by supplying only perfunctory effort on
noncontractible tasks.
model. First, let us look at a "pure adaptation" model in which k (A) = oc for all A # 0, so that
influence activities are impossible by assumption. To minimize alignment costs, the managers want
to allocate control of both decisions to the manager who has more to lose from not having his ideal
decision rule implemented. Since aL > R, the optimal control structure involves unifying control
with manager L (g* = I).
Next, let us look at a "pure influence" model in which k (A) = !A 2 and aL = aR. Under any2
control structure, each decision will be A away from one of the manager's ideal decisions. Since
aL = aR, both managers care equally about the resulting loss. That is, ALIGN (g) does not
depend on g and thus the control structure will be chosen to minimize influence costs. Here, the
managers will optimally choose to divide control. To see why, notice that by proposition 1, the
total amount of time wasted on influence activities (E3, A3) is independent of g. Since influence
costs are convex, INFL (g) is minimized under divided control.' 4 That is, g* = NI is optimal.
In the richer model in which A = R and aL > a R, these opposing forces lead to a non-trivial
trade off, provided aL is not too large relative to aR. There is a critical value of the signal-to-noise
ratio (* such that if p < p*, control will optimally be concentrated and if p > p*, control will
optimally be divided. This leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 2.2 Assume aR < aL < OaR. Divided control is optimal if and only if
L _R2 a- a (2)
3 (aR)2 - (aL)2
The condition that the manager L cares more about the decision than manager R but not too
much more (i.e. aL < 3aR) is best understood by considering the case in which manager R is
essentially indifferent about both decisions but manager L is not. Then it is clear that control
should be concentrated with manager L. Also, note that the level of disagreement, A, does not
matter for the optimal control structure. The reason for this is that with quadratic preferences and
quadratic influence costs, both ALIGN and INFL are proportional to A 2 and thus differences in
A 2 do not affect the relative trade-off between minimizing alignment costs and influence costs.15
When are influence costs large relative to alignment costs? Condition (2) implies that whenever
the signal-to-noise ratio is large, the costs of integration exceed the costs of non-integration. Further
"'More generally, with an arbitrary increasing and convex cost function k, we need that k"/k' > k"'/k". This is
satisfied for k (A) = cA for all (.
"5More generally, an increase in A makes integration relatively less appealing if k"' > 0 and makes integration
relatively more appealing if k' < 0.
unpacking p (which is equal to he ), non-integration is preferred whenever the level of ex ante
uncertainty is high (i.e. h small) or the signal is very informative (i.e. hE large) and thus will
be relied heavily upon. Influence-activity mitigation therefore provides a basis for a theory of the
optimal control structure.
This section began by arguing that this model would provide a framework for thinking about the
"haggling" versus "fiat" trade-off. In what sense is this the case? Interpreting the opportunity costs
of influence activities as the costs of "haggling,"' 6 this model generates the prediction that such
costs should be greater under integration than under non-integration. Put differently, the model
in this section suggests that the cost of "fiat" (interpreted here as unified control) is increased
"haggling," and thus the current model does not deliver the Williamson (1971) trade-off. This will
be resolved in section 6, which allows for integration to be coupled with organizational practices
aimed at reducing "haggling."
2.5 Rigid Organizational Practices
Recall that under a control structure in which party i controls N-j decision rights, manager j's
equilibrium influence activities are |j = JAI N-jac p (Proposition 2.1). The previous section
emphasized the scope for using N- as an instrument for mitigating influence activities (Proposition
2.2). However, as Milgrom and Roberts (1988, 1992) highlight, there are many other methods
available for mitigating influence activities. These include rigid decision-making rules, flat incentive
schemes, defensive information acquisition, closed-door policies, etc.. While the adoption of many
of these organizational practices would otherwise seem inefficient, they begin to make sense when
one considers the effect they may have on the incentives for influence activities.
In the context of this model, any institution that reduces a, A, or p will reduce equilibrium
influence activities. For example, adopting closed-door policies in which decision makers are effec-
tively insulated from relevant information could correspond to a decrease in h, (and hence in p).
Such a policy will reduce the private return to influence activities and will thus discourage them.
This would not be costless, since it would also effectively reduce the amount of information the
decision maker has available to make a decision. Similarly, putting into place incentive schemes
that effectively make a manager indifferent about the decision being taken (which could correspond
'
6 Because influence activities do not affect the conditional variance of a given s, they have no equilibrium effect
on the quality of ex post decisions. The model thus focuses only on the opportunity costs of influence activities. A
richer model could allow for both opportunity costs and degradation in decision quality.
to a decrease in that manager's a) would have such an effect as well. The costs of low-powered
incentive schemes, of course, is diminished motivation for putting in (here unmodeled) effort. The
decision makers could hire outside consultants to acquire information about the state of the world.
This "defensive information acquisition" would lead to an increase in h, a reduction in p, and thus
a reduced incentive to influence. However, hiring an outsider who, by definition, is not an insider
and thus not privy to the relevant information, is costly.
For the purposes of the present section, I analyze a fairly blunt instrument with costs that are
endogenous to the model. Assume party L has both decision rights. The model is as above, except
that in the first period, instead of bargaining over the control structure, L and R bargain over
whether or not to carry out their relationship under an open or closed door policy. They may trim
out personnel whose job it is to gather relevant information, they may purposefully load up their
schedules and keep themselves too busy to pay attention to everything that crosses their desks, or
they may limit the frequency and length of meetings with each other. Let 0 E G = {0, 1} denote
this choice. Under an open door policy (denoted by 0 = 0), the rest of the game proceeds as usual.
Under a closed door policy (denoted by 0 = 1), no public signal is realized in period 3.17 Let W (0)
denote the expected ex ante equilibrium welfare under organizational practice 0. The Coasian
program is
max {W (0)} .
OEG
If no public signal is realized, neither manager will have the incentive to exert any influence
over it, and thus AL AR = 0. This is potentially worthwhile if manager R would otherwise have
a strong incentive to influence the signal (i.e. if p is large). Since there is no additional information
on which to base his decisions, L will set both decisions equal to the prior mean. If the prior is
very imprecise (i.e. h is small), this is potentially very costly, but if there is already a wealth of
information (i.e. h is large) about the decision to be made, then it might not be very costly to have
a closed door policy. This is captured in the following proposition.
Proposition 2.3 In this model, when control is unified, a closed door policy (0 = 1) is preferred
to an open door policy (0 = 0) whenever ph > D (A 2 , aL, aR),where (D is increasing in aL and
decreasing in a? and A 2 .
171 can instead allow for a more convex set of policies. For example, if y denotes the signal-to-noise ratio, the
players could bargain over a level of "noise" they could put into the signal, which reduces he up to the point where
the effective signal-to-noise ratio is given by (1 - 0) p. This can be interpreted as shutting off certain lines of
communication. The rest of the analysis would proceed similarly. Proposition 2.7 in Appendix A analyzes this case.
The logic of influence-activity mitigation can help shed light on why certain rigid organizational
practices persist. A recent series of papers starting with Bloom and Van Reenen (2007) documents
substantial dispersion in management practices across firms, and in particular, highlights the preva-
lence of firms with puzzling ("bad") management practices. They conduct a survey inquiring about
eighteen specific management practices of individual manufacturing plants (e.g. about whether or
not the firm adopts continuous improvement initiatives, the criteria the firm uses for promotions).
Each response is scored on a 1 -5 scale, with 1 being considered a "bad" management practice and
a 5 being considered "good". They construct a firm's management score by taking a normalized
average of the scores for each individual practice and find that firms with higher management scores
perform better (have higher sales, higher profitability, are less likely to exit, and have greater sales
growth) than firms with lower management scores.
The negative correlation between "bad" management practices and firm performance is consis-




Figure 2: Endogenous Practice Selection
A firm operating in an environment with greater levels of disagreement (i.e. with a higher A) will,
all else equal, perform worse than a firm with a lower A. Further, such a firm will be plagued
by greater influence activities (since V is increasing in A) and thus will find that adopting a
closed-door policy is relatively more appealing. There will be some cutoff value A* such that
firms with A < A* will have open door policies and better performance and firms with A > A*
will have closed door policies and worse performance. Thus, a simple selection story along these
lines could account for a negative correlation between closed-door policies ("bad" management
practices) and firm performance. Further, since firms choose their management practices optimally,
any outside intervention resulting in a change in management practices would lead to a decrease
in firm efficiency. In particular, an intervention aimed at altering management practices for poorly
performing firms would lead to a decrease in the performance of such firms.18
2.6 Practices and Control
In analyzing the effects of a change in the allocation of control, further differences between control
structures (beyond the identity of the party(ies) with the control) should be derived, not assumed.
Such an approach is substantive, not merely aesthetic. For example, if integration is viewed as
a concentration of control bundled with inefficient bureaucracy, this naturally begs the question
of why can we not concentrate control without the concomitant inefficient bureaucracy, perhaps
through contractual allocation of control rights? In this section, I will show that rigid organizational
practices may arise optimally in response to concentrated control without regards to the methods
used to concentrate control (i.e. in my model, formal integration and "contractual integration"
are the same). For continued simplicity, I will focus on the stark instrument of closed/open door
policies. The model is similar to the previous section, except now L and R bargain over the control
structure in addition to the (closed/open door policy). That is, in the first period, L and R bargain
over (g, 0) E G - {I, NI} x {0, 1}. The rest of the analysis proceeds as above.
In order to draw a parallel to the "haggling" versus "fiat" argument of Williamson (1971), I first
introduce some terminology. A choice of g is referred to as a control structure, and a choice of 0 is
referred to as an organizational practice. A governance structure is the joint choice of a pair (g, 0),
as it forms a complete description of how the transaction is to be governed. Only three governance
structures will shown to be chosen in equilibrium: (1, 0) , (I, 1), and (NI, 0). These are referred,
respectively, as "directed transaction," "hierarchy," and "market." Markets are characterized by
divided control and flexible organizational practices. The defining feature of hierarchy is that
"This, of course, assumes that management practices are chosen optimally. To the extent that certain practices are
not adopted due to managerial unawareness or mistakes, such interventions could potentially improve the performance
of firms. Bloom et al. (2011) conducts such an intervention and shows that improving management practices leads
to improved performance in Indian manufacturing firms.
decision making is carried out by fiat, in the following two senses: (1) all relevant decisions are
made by a single decision maker (control is unified) and (2) the decisions made are somewhat
arbitrary, in that they are made without regard to changes in the environment (rigid organizational
practices are adopted).
Under either control structure, setting 0 = 1 eliminates the incentive for (and hence the presence
of) influence activities. Given that the costs of influence activities is zero when 0 1 for both g = I
and g = NI, it is clear that g = I will be preferred whenever 0 = 1. Closed-door policies are thus
inconsistent with non-integration. Fixing 0 = 0, Proposition 2 implies that there will be some
o such that non-integration is preferred if and only if <p > . Let W (g, 0) denote the expected
equilibrium welfare under decision right allocation g and organizational practice 0. It can be shown
that
W (g, 0) = (ADAP (0) + ALIGN (g) + INFL (g, 0)),




It is worth noting that the only term that depends both on the control structure and the orga-
nizational practices is INFL (g,0). Define I > NI. The intuition described above suggests that
INFL (g, 0) exhibits decreasing differences in g and 0,19 and hence W (g, 0) exhibits increasing
differences in g and 0. Let X denote a vector of parameters of the model. The complementarity
between g and 0 gives us the following proposition.
Proposition 2.4 Let aR < L < V"aR. Then W (9,0) exhibits increasing differences in g and
0. Further, minx 0* (I, x) > maxx 0* (NI, X).
This implies the empirical proposition that transactions within firms are more rule-driven and
rigid than transactions carried out in the market, which has been discussed by Williamson, "In-
terorganizational conflict can be settled by fiat only rarely, if at all... intraorganizational settlements
by fiat are common... ." (1971, emphasis in the original) The following figure results from a full
9 In fact, this holds even if 0 is a continuous variable between 0 and 1, where a choice of 0 affects the noise of the
signal such that the signal-to-noise ratio becomes (1 - 0) h.





Figure 3: Optimal Governance Structures
There are three boundaries of note in this figure. I refer to the vertical boundary between
"Directed Transaction" and "Market" as the "Meyer, Milgrom, and Roberts boundary": a firm rife
with politics should perhaps disintegrate. 20 The diagonal boundary between "Directed Transac-
tion" and "Hierarchy" is the "Milgrom and Roberts boundary": rigid decision-making rules should
sometimes be adopted within firms. The presence of these two boundaries highlights the idea that
non-integration and bureaucratization are substitute mechanisms: sometimes a firm will prefer to
control influence activities with the former and sometimes with the latter.
The third boundary is the "markets versus hierarchies boundary" (Williamson 1975). Some-
times, the market mechanism, with its high-powered incentives and open lines of communication
invite such high levels of influence activities ("haggling") that it should be superseded by a hierar-
chy (unified control) coupled with rigid organizational practices. This becomes increasingly true the
greater is the level of ex post disagreement between the parties (A) and the greater is the level of ex
ante uncertainty (as measured by a small value of h or a large value of o). The latter is consistent
with many of the classical empirical papers in support of Transaction Cost Economics (Masten
2"This is consistent with Forbes and Lederman (2009)'s argument that the principal obstacle to integration between
major airlines and regional carriers is that integration invites the regional carrier's work force (which is comparatively
less well-compensated than the major's) to lobby for higher pay.
(1984); Masten, Meehan, and Snyder (1991); Lieberman (1991); Hanson (1995)), where measures
of the uncertainty or complexity of the environment a firm operates in serves as the empirical proxy
for the level of contractual incompleteness, which is the actual object of interest in TCE.
Figure 4 below depicts the relationship between the level of uncertainty surrounding a transac-
tion and the potential "haggling" costs under each of the three potential governance structures. The
bolded segments depict the actual "haggling" costs under the optimal governance structure. In sec-
tion 4, 1 argued that the cost of unified control was an increase in "haggling." Holding organizational
practices fixed, this is indeed the case, as shown by the difference between the Inf1 (NI,8 = 0) and
Infl (I, 0 = 0) lines. However, changing organizational practices in addition to the control struc-
ture completely eliminates "haggling," as shown by the difference between the Inf 1 (NI, 0 = 0) and
Inf1 (I, 0 = 1) lines. A firm with p > o** that decides to integrate will adopt rigid organizational
practices, opting for unresponsive decision making by "fiat" rather than responsive decision making
and "haggling."
Infif(N(==)
Figure 4: Equilibrium influence costs
Whereas Williamson views "bureaucratic costs of hierarchy... [as] a deterrent to integration,"
this model views the bureaucratic costs of hierarchy as the lesser of two evils, the alternative to
which is high levels of influence activities. This view cautions against the popular advice that one
should "bring the market inside the firm" as a way of strengthening incentives - doing so will often
create more problems than it solves. Rather, this model underscores the importance of aligning
these instruments with each other and with the environment the organization operates in.
2.7 Internal Structure of a Multidivisional Firm
I interpret the model in the previous sections as a model of the boundaries of the firm. However,
the same logic that determines firm boundaries and organizational practices in the previous sections
can also be used to explain the internal structure of firms. Should control within an organization
reside with headquarters or with division managers? Should the organization adopt rigid or flexible
practices? The model in this section is related to a pair of recent papers (Alonso, Dessein, and
Matouschek (2008), hereafter ADM, and Rantakari (2008)) exploring the performance implications
of various control structures on a firm's ability to adapt to local circumstances and to coordinate
decisions across divisions. These papers emphasize the role of strategic communication in transmit-
ting soft information within the organization, whereas this section will instead emphasize the role
of influence activities in affecting the transmission of hard information. These two complementary
approaches differ substantially in their implications.
There are two division managers and a headquarters, denoted by L, R, and HQ respectively,
and one decision to be made for each division: dL and dR. Each decision is ideally tailored to the
local state of the division, s. ~ N (E [si , h-'), i E {L, R}, where E [sL] - E [SRI = A > 0, but
information directly relevant to the state of the world is unobserved. Instead, an informative (but
manipulable) signal relevant to each division is commonly observed. This signal is linear in the
division's local state, si, the level of influence activities the manager of that division engages in, A',
and a noise term, eZ ~ N (0, h; 1). That is, o-, = si + A' + e, for i E {L, R}. However, coordination
across divisions is also important. There are two possible control structures: control can either
be unified and held by the headquarters (g = cent) or divided and held by the respective division
managers (g = dec). 21 Additionally, as in the previous section, the organization can adopt a closed
door policy (0 1) or an open door policy (0 = 0). Under the closed door policy, no signals are
realized. 2
The timing of the model is as follows: (1) L and R bargain over a governance structure (g, 0) E
21 As in ADM, I only explore centralization and decentralization. I do not examine the asymmetric control structures
of Rantakari. I can show that each asymmetric control structure is always dominated by at least one symmetric control
structure. Rantakari derives similar results when divisions are symmetric.
2
2A richer model would allow for only one signal to be realized. Allowing for this could potentially make an
asymmetric control structure optimal, even though the divisions are symmetric. I leave this for future research.
{ cent, dec} x {0, 1};23 (2) L and R simultaneously choose (unobservable) influence activities AL, AR E
A C R at cost k (As) = 1 (A') 2 ; (3) L, R, and HQ commonly observe two signals a =_ si+A+ei, i
L, R; (4) the party(ies) with control choose decisions; (5) payoffs are realized. The key differences
between the present model and the model in the previous section are (a) the presence of division-
specific signals, (b) the prospect of allocating control to a third party, and (c) the payoff structure,
to which I will now turn. Division manager i has gross payoffs of the following form
U (si, sj, d, d) = (i - si)2 - 2 (di -
and the headquarters has a gross payoff of UHQ - UL + UR.
Both managers desire to match their decisions to their local states and the decisions of the
other division. The key source of friction is that, on average, manager L wants a higher decision
than manager R does, and he only partially internalizes the coordination losses this imposes. The
headquarters fully internalizes the coordination externalities, and absent influence activities, it
would always be optimal to centralize control with the headquarters.2 4
As before, given a governance structure, the solution concept will be pure strategy perfect
Bayesian equilibrium. Under any governance structure, the equilibrium decision rule dg is a convex
combination of estimators si and si. When 0 = 0, the equilibrium decision rules are given by
dg'""=o C' (r) ((1 - o) E [si) + o (o-i - Ai (g))
+ (1 - C9 (r)) ((1 - o) E [sj] + cp (,-j - A ()
and when 0 = 1, no public signals are available, and thus the equilibrium decision rules are given
by
dg'--:: = C9 (r) E [si] + (1 - C9 (r)) E [s].
The control structure affects the equilibrium decision rules in two ways. First, it can be shown
that 1 > Cdec (r) > C"' (r) > 1, and both are decreasing in r. That is, under decentralized
decision making, decision rules exhibit more of an own-division bias. This is because under de-
centralization, the division managers do not fully internalize the coordination externalities they
2 3Alternatively, if one permits the headquartes to take into account the anticipated private costs of influence
activities by the managers (say because the headquarters has to attract them to work for the firm), one can think of
the headquarters as unilaterally choosing a governance structure.
24 The coordination motive for unified control was absent in the previous model, since the ideal decisions were
independent from each other.
impose on the other division. Secondly, the control structure determines who makes decisions and
hence determines whose information about influence activities is used to make decisions. Under
centralization, the headquarters makes decisions based on conjectures about influence activities.
Under decentralization, division managers know their own influence activities but not the influence
activities of the other division manager.
Given a governance structure (g, 0) and a decision rule d9,, in period 2, player i chooses his
level of influence activities to solve
r d 0] d o)& (d - dg 1k' (A') = Es s- - d + rE, (L - (3)
influence for adaptation influence for coordination
Under decentralization, manager L influences the signal upward in an attempt to convince
manager R that he will take a higher decision than he actually will. Out of equilibrium, this will
induce R to take a higher decision in order to coordinate with him, which is preferable on average
for L. Manager R will influence the signal downward for the same reason. I refer to this as the
"influence for coordination" motive. Because of the additive signal structure, these attempts at
manipulating each others' decisions will have no effect on the equilibrium decision, however. Under
centralization, the motivation for influence activities is different. Since the headquarters always
chooses to coordinate decisions more than is privately optimal for each manager, each manager will
attempt to influence the signal in order to bias the decision in their division's direction. I refer to
this as the "influence for adaptation" motive. When 0 = 1, neither manager has any incentive to
influence their division's signal. Equilibrium influence activities under each governance structure
are then.
AL* AR*
dec ( ) 2 A ((1 - 0) -( r A (1 - 0)
cent 4ArA ( - 6) - S (1 - 0)
Under an open door policy, the level of influence activities is greater under centralization than
under decentralization, leading to a non-trivial trade-off. Centralization leads to more coordinated
decisions, but it does so at the cost of greater influence activities. This is described in the following
proposition (which is proven in the appendix).
Proposition 2.5 Fix 0 = 0. Then decentralization is preferred to centralization whenever ( q (r) - hA 2 >
2, where q (r) , q' (r) > 0. As r, he, h, and A 2 increase, decentralization becomes relatively more ap-
pealing.
Decentralization reduces the costs of influence activities. As he, A 2 , and r increase, influence
activities become relatively more appealing and hence so does a control structure that mitigates
them. The last of these is perhaps surprising, given the widespread intuition that as coordination
becomes more important, an organization should become more centralized. This is a feature of ADM
and Rantakari. In the present model, an increase in r increases the "influence for adaptation" motive
significantly, since under centralization, the increase in r moves each division's decision farther away
from its manager's ideal. In ADM and Rantakari, however, an increase in r improves the quality of
communication of soft information, since it actually increases the alignment of preferences within
the firm.
Closed door policies eliminate the incentives for influence activities. Absent influence activities,
centralization is always preferred. Thus, as in the model of firm boundaries, closed door policies
are inconsistent with decentralization. Conditional on centralization, when should an organization
opt for closed door policies?
Proposition 2.6 Fix g = cent. If o > o(r), then 0 = 1 is preferred to 0 = 0 whenever
H (r, A 2 , a, h) > HI (r), where H is increasing in A 2 , p, and h.
I derive the exact expressions of p, H, and H in the appendix. The intuition for this proposition
is relatively similar. An increase in A 2 and p increases influence activities and thus increases the
benefits of adopting organizational practices aimed at mitigating them.
Finally, as in the previous section, organizational practices and control structures interact:
the returns to rigid organizational practices are greater when control is concentrated (and thus
influence activities would otherwise be high). If we refer to (cent, 0), (cent, 1), and (dec, 0) as
"Centralization," "Centralized Bureaucracy," and "Decentralization," respectively, this can be seen




Figure 5: Optimal Governance Structures
Thus, rigid organizational practices are expected to positively covary with centralized decision
making. Further, for A and <p sufficiently large (so that Centralization is not optimal), a further
increase in A simultaneously increases the relative attractiveness of Centralized Bureaucracy and
decreases the performance of the firm across all governance structures. This leads to the possibility
of a selection-based, rather than causal, story for a positive correlation between decentralization
and firm performance.
Bloom, Sadun, and Van Reenen (2011) conduct a survey to collect data on measures of decen-
tralization of key decisions within firms (asking questions such as "Who has the authority to hire
new full-time workers?" and "How much capital investment can a plant manager make without
authorization from headquarters?"). In addition, for each of the surveyed firms, they also col-
lect data on management practices (as in Bloom and Van Reenen (2007)). Among their findings
are a positive correlation between their measure of decentralization and their measure of manage-
ment practices (table 4, column 2) and a positive correlation between decentralization and firm
performance (table 5), both of which are consistent with the model in this section.
2.8 Conclusion
This paper develops a unified theory of the costs and benefits of integration based on the logic of
influence-cost mitigation. Managers waste time persuading decision makers, and firm boundaries
and organizational practices are determined on account of this. It provides an interpretation of
haggling costs-the opportunity cost of time spent attempting to persuade decision makers-and
unpacks what it means to make decisions by fiat into (1) unified control and (2) decision making
that is detached from relevant information. In doing so, it shows that decision making by fiat in
the first sense exacerbates haggling costs: if one of two parties specializes in making decisions, the
other will specialize in trying to convince him that they should be made in one way rather than
another. On the other hand, fiat in the second sense implies that influence activities fall on deaf
ears, thus eliminating haggling altogether.
When does the cost of decision making by fiat involve only an increase in haggling (so that there
is no trade-off per se between haggling and fiat), and when does it involve unresponsive decisions
(so that one must choose between haggling and unresponsive decision making)? I show that when
transactions are sufficiently complicated (i.e. there is much ex ante uncertainty, disagreement, or
parties have a large stake in the decisions), optimal decision making by fiat always involves the
latter. Complementarities between unified control and rigid organizational practices thus lead to a
notion of "Williamsonian integration" in which there is a trade-off betwen rigid decision making by
fiat and haggling costs. The extent of the costs of each of these components is related to the level
of uncertainty in the environment and hence this explanation is consistent with the Williamson
(1973) idea that "substantially the same factors that are ultimately responsible for market failures
also explain failures of internal organization."
Influence-activity mitigation also provides the foundations for a theory of the internal organi-
zation of a multidivisional firm. Centralized control structures aid in coordinating decisions but
can lead division managers to lobby the headquarters to bias decisions in favor of their division. In
order to reduce influence activities, a firm can either decentralize decision making or adopt rigid
organizational practices ("bureaucratize"). This approach justifies a wide range of policies present
in firms, and its empirical implications are consistent with correlations found in recent papers by
Bloom and Van Reenen (2007) and Bloom, Sadun, and Van Reenen (2011). These include the pos-
itive correlations between good management practices and firm performance, good management
practices and decentralization, and decentralization and performance.
2.9 Appendix A: Omitted Proofs and Computations
Proposition 2.7 In the full model of section 6, ex ante expected equilibrium welfare as a function
of the allocation of decision rights g E {I, NI}, the organizational practices 0 E [0, 1], and a vector
X of parameters, is given by
W (g, 0, x) = - (ADAP (0, x) + ALIGN (g, X) + INFL (g, 0, X)).
Further, these three components can be expressed as
a L + 4 R aL _ RADAP (0, X) = +wh~he h
ALIGN (g, X) = NLaR An 2 g = NI
INFL (g, 0, x) = (1 0)22(aR)2 A22 g
(1- 0)2 (aR)2 _+ (JL) 2) A 2p 2  g =NI
Proof. Suppose the managers have agreed upon a control structure g and a level of organiza-
tional practices 0 E [0, 1]. The variance of the signal is then given by he (1- 0) h0h , which
reduces the signal-to-noise ratio in the updating formula to (1 - 0) p. Condition (1) then implies
that
* (1 - 0) N- 3  A o,
so that INFL (g, 0, X) = E{LR2, which is equal to the expression given in the statement
of the proposition. We know from section 3 that
d*g (o-; A*) =E [so, A*] + = (1 - 0) > (s + i) + 3i,
where i ~ N (0, hE). Substituting this into the definition of W (g, 0, x) gives us
W(g, 0, X) = - E8 ~ (d*g (o-; A*) - s 3 i) -INFL(g,8, ).
iE{L,R}
The bracketed term can be decomposed into sum of the a variance and a bias term. Since the for
decision f is 0 if i controls f under g, the bias term is equal to ALIGN (g, x) given above. The
variance term is given by
2
ADAP (0, x) = Var (d*9 (o-; A*) - s)
f=1 iE{L,R}
(aL R) Vr (d*g (. L _ R = +Oh
which is the desired result. m
Proposition 2.8 In this model, when control is unified, a closed door policy (0 = 1) is preferred
to an open door policy (0 = 0) whenever cph > (b (A 2 , aLaR), where ED (A 2 , aL, CR) is increasing
in aL and decreasing in aR and A 2 .
Proof. Applying proposition 7, W (I, 1, X) > W (I, 0, x) whenever
1h > - + R) - (A 2 , aL, aR)2 (aR)2 A2
and <b clearly satisfies the described comparative statics. 0
Proposition 2.9 For a general increasing convex cost function k, in the pure influence model in
which aL = aR = a, divided control is optimal if k"/k' > k!".k". This condition is satisfied for
k (A) = cA for all ( > 0.
Proof. Under non-integration, |k' (Ai) - |AI aso and under integration, AL = 0 and k' (AR)
2 A I ao. Total influence costs are 2k (k'-1 (1A I ar)) under non-integration and k (k'- 1 (2 1l aIO))
under integration. A sufficient condition for the latter to be larger is that the function k (k'- 1 (x))
is convex in x. Let h (x) = k'- 1 (x). Then
d 2
-k (h (x)) = k" (h (x)) (h' (x))2 + k' (h (x)) h" (x)dx
k' (h (x)) k" (h (x)) k.' (h (x))>
[k" (h (x))]2 Kk' (h (x)) k" (h (x)))
This is positive for all A if the parenthetical term is positive for all A. Finally, note that if k (A) = cAt,
then the parenthetical term is i > 0, so this is satisfied. m
Proposition 2.10 Given a governance structure (g, 0), there exists a pure-strategy PBE of the
multidivisional firm model with
and influence activities given by
AL*
dec (r 2 Ap (1 - 0)
cent rAP (1 -0)
AR*
- (1 )Ay (1 -0)
-1-0)
Proof. To see this, plug in the decision rules to verify that they indeed form an equilibrium
given beliefs about influence activities. Influence activities then solve (3). *
Corollary 2.1 Under the multidivisional firm model, welfare can be decomposed as follows
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4r 2 1 (2P + A 2 ) + O
r2 ( 1 2 2 +
Coord (g, 0) Inf1 (g. 0)
Proposition 2.11 The following are true. W (dec, 0) > W (cent, 0) if (sq (r) - hA 2 > 2
where q (r) = (1+5r8r 2 (1+3r) > 1 and q' (r) > 0. Thus, (dec, 0) becomes more appealing relative to(1±2r)2 (1+4r)
(cent, 0) when o, r, h, and A 2 increase. W (cent, 1) > W (dec, 0) if 4 (r) OhA 2 > 1, where q (r)
42r 2 < 1 and 4' (r) > 0. Thus, (cent, 1) becomes more appealing relative to (dec, 0) when
o, r, h, and A2 increase. W (cent, 0) > W (cent, 1) if 'r2  1+4r 2 and r 2A 2  h 2ad+4(1+2r) P2 (1+2r) -(1+4r)
2 > 1+4r The rhs of the first inequality is decreasing in p and h, and thus (cent, 0) becomes




=C' (r) ((1 - (1 - 0) o) E [si] + (1 - 0) O (0-i - i(g))
+ (1 - C9 (r) ((1 - (1 - 0) cp) E [s1] + (1 - 0) O (or - i5 (g),
dg'
Proof. These are relatively straightforward by noting that
(2r + 1)2 (4r + 1)
oc (q(r) -
(2
) A2h - 2
= 1 + 2r + 2r 2
(1 + 2r)2 /
oc 1 (r) phA2
h \
(5r + 8r2 + 1) (3r + 1)
(2r + 1)2 (4r + 1)
ra2hA2
(1 + 2r)2 (1 + 2r + 2r2)
W (cent,0) -W (cent,1) 1
(1 + 4r)2
- r2A2)
The comparative statics for the relative welfare computations are straightforward. m
2.10 Appendix B: Interim Signaling Version
Suppose there are two decision rights. Consider the game with the following timing: (1) L and
R bargain over a control structure g E G; (2) sL E S is drawn and observed by L (but not R)
and sR E S is drawn and observed by R (but not L); (3) L and R simultaneously choose influence
activities AL AR at costs !A2 . Public signals 2 = s' + A' are publicly observed; (4) whoever has
control chooses decisions d; (5) parties receive gross payoffs (letting s = sL + SR)
2
U (s,d) = -2(de-s - #) 2
t=1
Suppose L has control of N -R decisions, and suppose L conjectures the equilibrium strategy
AR* (sR) of R. He chooses each decision d to solve
max E, aL
-2 d -s
- #L) 2 SL, 
.R
d* (sL o-R) = E [s sL .R] 3L L( R - E [ AR* (SR)IRJ) OL.




W (dec, 0) - W (cent, 0)
W (dec, 0) - W (cent, 1)
A2 -2-I
SR I R2
12 (1 + 4r) ~ (1 + 4r) (1 + 2r )3P2 _2 0 (I+2)
. (1I r2 + 2r +2) - (1 + 4r)
8 R 2
Taking first-order conditions (and imposing the equilibrium restriction that AL* (sL) 0)
AR* (sR) = N-RR (A + E [AR* (SR R - R* (8R)).
Taking expectations of both sides, E [A R* (sR) |R] = N-RaRA, and therefore AR* (sR) = N-RaR.
The incentives to influence the signal are thus the same in this model as in the baseline model with
(p = 1.
2.11 Appendix C: Organizational Rules
This appendix outlines a simple model of endogenous organizational rules. If managers can commit
ex ante to a decision rule (as a function of an informative, but manipulable signal), when will they
prefer a responsive decision rule that takes the signal into account, and when will they prefer to
make decisions "in the dark"? There is a natural trade-off that parallels the haggling versus fiat
argument of section 6: a responsive decision rule makes use of potentially valuable information, but
it also invites influence activities.
In order to make progress on this question, I depart from the model in section 2 and analyze
a binary-state, binary-signal model. Since influence activities by definition affect the conditional
disribution of the signal (given the state of the world), in this binary case, they necessarily also
affect the conditional variance of the signal and thus its information content. This leads to the
additional (Milgrom and Roberts 1988) effect, absent in the model in section 2, that "when...
underlying information is so complex that unscrambling is impossible, decision makers will have to
rely on information they know is incomplete or inaccurate." Optimal decision rules may thus also
be unresponsive on account of this.
There are two managers, L and R, a single decision to be made d E {L, R}, and two potential
states of the world s E {L, R}. A signal o e {L, R} is commonly observed, and the parties
can specify a decision rule ex ante that depends on it. Absent influence activities, the signal is
informative. Denote q0 = Pr [a = s = k], k E {L, R}. Then q0 > j. The prior is given by a scalar
P0 = Pr [s = R].
When the state of the world is perfectly known, both managers agree on the optimal decision.
However, the managers disagree on what decision should be taken when there is uncertainty about




When the state of the world is L, manager L receives 1 and manager R receives 3 < 1 if d - L.
When the state of the world is L, both managers receive 0 if d = R. Without any additional
information about the state of the world, manager L prefers d = L iff po < - and R prefers






Figure 6: Preferred Decisions
As in the previous models, the timing is as follows: (1) L and R bargain over a decision rule
d (o-); (2) L and R simultaneously decide whether or not to influence the signal at cost K; (3)
the signal is commonly observed; (4) d (o-) is taken; (5) payoffs are realized. The key difference
here are that the "governance structure" the managers choose is an autonomous decision rule that
depends directly on the signal. For the purposes of this model, think of K small but positive to
break indifference.
Before describing the mechanics of influence activities in this model, let us first characterize the
first-best decision rule (i.e. the joint surplus maximizing decision rule in a world in which there is
no scope for influence activities). When the decision is a "slam dunk," (i.e. po is close to either
0 or 1), the first-best decision rule is not responsive. Only when there is substantial uncertainty
about the state of the world should the decision rule be responsive to the signal. That is, there
exists cutoffs po and po such that
L 0 < po &P
d FB PO < po <PNO
R PO < po <
Influence takes a simple form. The signal is drawn from division L with probability j (i.e.
S= (TL) and drawn from division R with probability 1 (i.e. a = aR). At cost K, manager i
can ensure that ag = i with probability 1 (without regard to the true state of the world). When
influence takes this form, when does manager L want to influence the signal? This, of course,
depends on the decision rule the players have agreed to ex ante. If they agree upon an unresponsive
decision rule, then neither player has any incentive to influence the signal.
If, however, they agree upon a responsive decision rule (i.e. d (u) = u), then if manager L
does not influence the signal, he receives (1 - po) qO + poqO #. If he does influence the signal, he
receives 1 - po. He thus wants to influence the signal whenever po <0pg (p) - 1q Similarly,
R will prefer to influence the signal whenever po > p (#) = . It can be shown that, for
# sufficiently close to 1, p (1) < p and p' (1) > fo, so that managers only want to manipulate
the signal when the decision rule in fact should not have depended on the signal to begin with.
For 1 sufficiently small, p(1) > Po and p0 (1) < po, so that for any po for which the first-
best decision rule should be responsive, equilibrium influence activities ensure that the signal is
completely uninformative. In this case, since K > 0, the optimal decision rule should in fact be
unresponsive.
For the intermediate case, A > (#) > and 1 > p0 (1)> p0 . Here, for any value of
PO E [ppR (1)] U [4(),po], the first-best decision rule is responsive and only one manager
will influence the signal. In this case, the signal will be informative with probability 1 (and
uninformative with probability 1), and thus it may be optimal to choose a responsive decision
rule (provided that K is sufficiently small). For po E [pR (#),p (1)], the optimal decision rule is
unresponsive, because the signal will be completely uninformative. The optimal decision rule thus
unravels from the middle as # decreases. These are captured in the following diagram.
d'= L d' R
-
- --- arge
d'= L d*= a d*= L d'= R d'= a d*= R
+~- -a- ++--* -++--+ 1-p moderate
d'= L d'= - d*= R
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Figure 7: Optimal Decision Rules
Thus, equilibrium influence activities can lead to overly rigid decision rules if there is sufficient
disagreement between the two managers.
Throughout, I have assumed that parties can commit ex ante to a decision rule. What if the
managers are unable to commit: after all, someone must actually make the decision. In this case,
there is a time-inconsistency problem. The managers might prefer an unresponsive rule in order to
eliminate the incentives for influence activities, but if neither manager has manipulated the signal,
it contains useful information for decision making, and thus optimally should be taken into account
by the decision maker. If he cannot commit to ignoring the signal, then in equilibrium someone
will manipulate it.
This opens up the possibility of using relational contracts (e.g. Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy
(1994), Levin (2003)) to partially commit a decision maker to a rigid decision rule. Such a rule
must explicitly be based on something (otherwise, how will other members of an organization
know it was followed?) The relational contracting view would generate predictions on the types of
rigid decision rules organizations would use. For instance, a rigid promotion rule should be based
explicitly on public information like seniority rather than something like a randomization device
(unless the actual randomization is carried out publicly). Basing such rules on variables that are not
commonly observable can potentially undermine relational enforcement and thus, by unravelling,
lead to influence activities. Relational commitment to rigid decision rules is a potentially interesting
direction for future research.
Chapter 3




Scholars and consultants in strategic management have long espoused two approaches to strategy
and organization: developing innovative new products through R&D and market research, on the
one hand, and producing existing products efficiently through process control and continuous im-
provement, on the other. But many observers quickly emphasize the difficulty of simultaneously
pursuing these "exploration" and "exploitation" (March 1991) approaches. For example, "Cost
leadership usually implies tight control systems, overhead minimization, pursuit of scale economies,
and dedication to the learning curve; these could be counterproductive for a firm attempting to
differentiate itself through a constant stream of creative new products" (Porter, 1985: 23). Fur-
thermore, as Chandler (1962) famously argued, a firm's strategy and organizational structure are
inextricably linked. In short, "Exploration and exploitation are quite different tasks, calling on
different organizational capabilities and typically requiring different organizational designs to effect
them" (Roberts, 2004: 255).
In quite a different tradition, economists have long celebrated the market's price mechanism for
its ability to aggregate and transmit information (Hayek, 1945; Grossman, 1976). The informative-
'This chapter is coauthored with Robert Gibbons and Richard Holden.
ness of the price mechanism thus raises the possibility that the market can (wholly or partially)
substitute for certain information-gathering and communication activities within the firm, thereby
affecting the firm's optimal strategy and organizational structure. But as Grossman and Stiglitz
(1976, 1980) pointed out, market equilibrium must be internally consistent. For example, when in-
formation is costly to acquire, market prices cannot be fully informative, otherwise no party would
have an incentive to acquire information in the first place.
In this paper we view firms and the market as institutions that shape each other: in industry
equilibrium, each firm takes the informativeness of the price mechanism as an important parameter
in its choice of organizational design, but these design decisions in turn affect the firm's participation
in the market and hence the informativeness of the price mechanism. We thus complement the
large and growing literature on how organizational structures and processes affect incentives to
acquire and communicate information.2 In particular, our analysis shows how one firm's optimal
organizational design depends not only on the uncertainty it faces but also on the designs other
firms choose. For example, if the market price is very informative, then many firms will choose
organizational designs to improve incentives for other activities (say, cost reduction), effectively
free-riding on the informativeness of the price mechanism. But the Grossman-Stiglitz insight
implies that not all firms can free-ride, lest the price mechanism contain no information.
To explore how the informativeness of the price mechanism and firms' organizational designs
choices interact, we analyze an economic environment that includes uncertainty. Formally, the
uncertainty concerns consumers' valuation of final goods, but we discuss other interpretations
below. As in other rational-expectations models, the price mechanism both clears the market
and conveys some information from informed to uninformed parties. The fact that the price is not
perfectly informative provides the requisite incentive for some parties to pay the cost of acquiring
further information.
As one example, consider firms like Apple (an explorer that excels at developing innovative
products) and Dell (an exploiter that achieves low costs through rigorous supply-chain manage-
ment). Although these kinds of firms may not be direct competitors in the product market, they
do participate in some of the same input markets, and broad industry trends do affect demand for
both kinds of firms. In principle, Dell could organize itself to conduct consumer research and R&D
2See Milgrom and Roberts (1988), Holmstrom and Tirole (1991), and Aghion and Tirole (1997) for early work
and Alonso, Dessein, and Matouschek (2008) and Rantakari (2008) for a sample of recent work; see Bolton and
Dewatripont (2011) and Gibbons, Matouschek, and Roberts (2011) for surveys.)
(as Apple does), but Dell does not do this. Instead, Dell's organizational structure and manager-
ial attention focus on supply-chain management. Dell can, however, infer something about broad
industry trends by observing prices in Apple's input markets. This example parallels our model,
in that it is the market-clearing price of an intermediate good that provides information about
demand for a final good.
Demand for Apple's products is clearly relevant to demand Dell's products. Dell could, in
principle, devote a large amount of resources to consumer research, focus groups, and new product
R&D (as Apple does). Dell does not do this, however. Dell's organizational structure is designed to
focus resources on supply chain management. They can, however, learn about demand for Apple's
products from prices markets for components for Apple's products (such as power-efficient mobile
microprocessors). This example parallel's our model, in that it is the market-clearing price of an
intermediate good which provides information about demand for a final good.
Many other applications of our approach arise if we consider alternative sources of uncertainty,
other than the value of downstream goods. For example, the uncertainty might concern whether
tariff barriers will change or whether a new technology will fulfill its promise. Interestingly, how-
ever, not all sources of uncertainty will do: our rational-expectations model requires some element
of common-value uncertainty (possibly partially correlated rather than perfectly common values)
rather than pure private-value uncertainty. As Grossman (1981: 555) puts it, in non-stochastic
economies (and certain economies with pure private-value uncertainty), "No one tries to learn any-
thing from prices [because] there is nothing for any individual to learn." Often, however, there is
something to learn from prices, such as when there is an element of common-value uncertainty.
To pursue these issues, we develop a rational-expectations model similar to Grossman and
Stiglitz (1976, 1980) but applied to a market for an intermediate good (e.g., prices and net sup-
ply are non-negative and the players are risk-neutral). In Gibbons, Holden, and Powell (2009;
hereafter GHP), we developed such a model but for the Grossman-Stiglitz case of individual in-
vestors. Relative to that paper (and other rational-expectations models), the innovation here is
the enrichment from individual investors to firms, where each firm chooses one of two alternative
organizational designs (one of which inspires a party within the firm to collect costly information,
as in Grossman-Stiglitz).
To model these firms, we develop a simplified version of the classic incomplete-contracting
approach initiated by Grossman and Hart (1986), but applied to the choice of governance struc-
ture within an organization (akin to Aghion and Tirole (1997)). To keep things simple, our
incomplete-contracts model involves only a single control right (namely, who controls a machine
that is necessary for production) and hence two feasible organizational designs. Regardless of who
controls the machine, each party can make a specific investment, but the incentives to make these
investments depend on who controls the machine. Following the incomplete-contracts approach
(i.e., analyzing one firm in isolation) reveals that the optimal organizational design is determined
by the marginal returns to these investments. In our model all firms are homogeneous ex ante,
so an incomplete-contracts analysis of a single firm would prescribe that all firms choose the same
organizational design. Relative to the incomplete-contracts approach, the novel component of our
model is the informativeness of the price mechanism, which endogenizes the returns to the parties'
specific investments and hence creates an industry-level determinant of an individual firm's choice
of organizational design.
In summary, our model integrates two familiar approaches: rational expectations (where an im-
perfectly informative price mechanism both permits rational inferences by some parties and induces
costly information acquisition by others) and incomplete contracts (where equilibrium investments
depend on the parties' allocation of control, and control rights are allocated to induce second-best
investments). Our main results are that: (1) under mild regularity conditions an equilibrium
exists; (2) ex ante identical firms may choose heterogeneous organizational designs; and (3) firms'
choices of organizational design and the informativeness of the price mechanism interact. In fact, in
our model, certain organizational designs may be sustained in market equilibrium only because the
price system allows some firms to benefit from the information-acquisition investments of others.
We also provide comparative statics on the proportion of firms that chose one organizational design
or the other.
Grossman and Helpman (2002), Legros and Newman (2008) and Legros and Newman (2009)
analyze other interactions between firms' governance structures and the market. These papers differ
from ours in two respects. First, in modeling firms' choice of governance structures, they focus on
the boundary of the firm (i.e., the integration decision) whereas we focus on the organizational de-
sign (specifically, the allocation of control within the organization). Second, and more importantly,
in modeling the market, they focus on the market-clearing rather than the informativeness aspect
of the price mechanism. That is, in these models, supply and demand determine prices, which
in turn determine the returns to the parties' actions and hence the parties' optimal governance
structures; meanwhile, the parties' actions in turn determine supply and demand, so governance
and pricing interact. As Grossman (1981: 555) notes, such Walrasian equilibria are not useful "as
a tool for thinking about how goods are allocated... when...information about the future... affects
current prices." In contrast to the aforementioned papers, our model focuses of the informative role
of prices - transferring information from informed to (otherwise) uninformed parties. We see our
approach as complementary to these others: in economies with uncertainty the price mechanism
clears the market and communicates information; without uncertainty, however, governance and
pricing can still interact, for the reasons explained in these papers.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we specify and discuss the model.
Section 3 analyzes the organizational-design choice of a single firm in isolation, and Section 4
analyzes the informativeness of the price mechanism, taking firms' organizational-design choices as
given. Section 5 then combines the incomplete-contracts and rational-expectations aspects of the
previous two sections, analyzing the equilibrium choices of organizational designs for all the firms
in the industry and hence deriving our main results. Section 6 offers an enrichment of our model
in terms of firms' choices about their boundaries and discusses how our approach relates to existing
theories of firm boundaries. Section 7 concludes.
3.2 The Model
3.2.1 Overview of the Model
We begin with an informal description of our model. There is a continuum of firms, each consisting
of an "engineer" and a "marketer" who both participate in a production process that can transform
one intermediate good (a "widget") into one final good. Any firm may purchase a widget in the
intermediate-good market. Each firm has a machine that can transform one widget into one final
good at a cost. The engineer in a given firm has human capital that allows her to make investments
that reduce the cost of operating that firm's machine. Likewise, the marketer in a given firm has
human capital that allows him to make investments that deliver information about the value of a
final good.
As is standard in incomplete-contracting models, the parties' incentives to make investments
depend on the allocation of control. There are two possible organizational designs (i.e. governance
structures inside the firm): marketing control and engineering control. In particular, in our model,
only the party that controls the machine will have an incentive to invest. Thus, in firms where
the marketer controls the machine, the marketer invests in information about the value of the final
good, whereas in firms where the engineer controls the machine, the engineer invests instead in cost
reduction and relies solely on the price mechanism for information about the value of the final good.
Naturally, if the price mechanism is more informative, the returns to investing in information are
lower so firms have a greater incentive to choose engineer control and invest instead in cost reduction.
As in rational-expectations models, however, when fewer firms invest in gathering information, the
price mechanism becomes less informative, thereby making marketer control more attractive. An
industry equilibrium must balance these two forces. We show that, given a rational-expectations
equilibrium, a unique equilibrium exists and is often interior (even though firms are identical ex
ante). In this sense, the price mechanism induces heterogenous behavior among homogeneous
firms. 3
3.2.2 Statement of the Problem
There is a unit mass of risk-neutral firms. Each firm i E [0, 1] consists of two parties, denoted E,
and Mi, and a machine that is capable of developing one intermediate good (a "widget") into one
final good at cost c. ~ U [c, c]. The machine can be controlled by either party, but it is firm-specific
(i.e., the machine is useless outside the firm) and its use is non-contractible (i.e., only the party
who controls the machine can decide whether to operate it). If party Ej controls the machine, we
say that the governance structure in firm i is gi = E, whereas if party Mi controls the machine, we
say that gi = M.
Final goods have an uncertain value. Party Mi can invest at cost KM to learn the value of a
final good in the market, v ~ U [v, v]. If Mi incurs this cost, Ei observes that Mi is informed but
does not herself observe v. Party Ei can invest at cost KE in reducing the cost of operating the
firm's machine. If Ej incurs this cost, Mi observes that Ej invested, so it is common knowledge
that c- is reduced to ci - A, where A < c. Both of these investments are non-contractible (e.g., for
Ei, neither the act of investing nor the resulting cost is contractible).
We embed these firms in a cousin of our rational-expectations model of price formation in
intermediate good markets (Gibbons, Holden and Powell (2010)). Firms may purchase widget(s)
in the intermediate-good market. The supply of widgets, x, is random and inelastic. Assume
x ~ U [x, z].
iWe label our parties "engineer" and "marketer" because their investments produce cost reductions and demand
forecasts, respectively. We have formulated a parallel model where market research is replaced by product devel-
opment. In this model, uninformed firms again invest in cost reduction (in producing the current generation of a
product), but informed firms now invest in trying to create the next-generation product. In the spirit of Christensen
(1997), the new product created by informed firms may be more valuable than the current product produced by
uninformed firms.
Equilibrium in the market for widgets occurs at the price p that equates supply and demand
(from informed and uninformed firms). In making decisions about purchasing a widget, firms that
are not directly informed about v (from investments by their marketers) make rational inferences
about v from the market price for widgets. Firms choose their governance structures (i.e., machine
control) taking into account the information they will infer from the market price and hence the
relative returns to their two parties' investments.
3.2.3 Timing and Assumptions
We now state the timing and assumptions of the model more precisely. We comment on these
assumptions in Section 2.4. There are six periods.
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Figure 1: Timeline
In the first period, industry-level uncertainty is resolved: the value of a final good v is drawn
from U [v, v] and the widget supply x is drawn from U [x, z], but neither of these variables is
observed by any party.
In the second period, the parties in each firm negotiate a governance structure gi E {E, M}:
under gi = E, party E controls the machine that can develop one widget into one final good; under
gi = M, party Mi controls this machine. This negotiation of governance structure occurs via Nash
bargaining.
In the third period, parties Ej and Mi simultaneously choose whether to make non-contractible
investments (or not) at costs KE and KM, respectively. The acts of making these investments are
observable but not verifiable, but the outcome of the marketer's investment (namely, learning v) is
observable only to Mi, not Ej.
In the fourth period, production planning takes place, in two steps. In period 4a, the parties Ej
and M, commonly observe c. , U [c, 5], the raw cost of running their machine, as well as 6i E {0, A},
the amount of cost reduction achieved by Ei's specific investment. Also, Mi (but not Ei) observes
so E {0, v} , a signal about the value v of the final good, where soj = 0 is the uninformative signal
received if party Mi has not invested KM in period 3, and vi = v is the perfectly informative signal
received if KM has been invested. We use the following notation for the parties' information sets:
Si (ci, o, 'pi) , s= (ci, o, 0), and si = (si, s9) . In period 4b, the market for widgets clears
at price p. In particular, any firm may buy a widget (but will not demand more than one widget
because the machine can produce only one final good from one widget).
In the fifth period, production occurs: if the party in control of the machine in firm i has a
widget, then he or she can run the machine to develop the widget into a final good at cost c, - S.
We denote the decision to produce a final good by q% = 1 and the decision not to do so by qj = 0.
In principle, off the equilibrium path, one party might control the machine and the other have a
widget, in which case the parties bargain over the widget and then the machine controller makes
the production decision. We assume that cashflow rights and control rights are inextricable, so
that whichever party controls the machine owns the final good (if one is produced) and receives
the proceeds.
Finally, in the sixth period, final goods sell for v and payoffs are realized. The expected payoffs
(before v is realized) are
rC = 1{gj=E}l{wj=1} [1{qi=1} (E [vlsEp (.,.) =p] - ci + Si) - p] , and
Arli = 1 gM 1 w1}1 [1{qi} (E [vosYp (-,-) p] - ci + S4) - p]
3.2.4 Discussion of the Model
Before proceeding with the analysis, we pause to comment on some of the modeling choices we have
made.
First, we assume that the machine is firm-specific. This assumption allows us to focus on the
market for widgets by eliminating the market for machines. By allowing both markets to operate,
one could analyze whether the informativeness of one affects the other.
Second, we have only one control right (over the machine) and hence only two candidate gov-
ernance structures. Our choice here is driven purely by parsimony; extending the model to allow
more assets (and hence more governance structures) could allow more interesting activities within
organizations than our simple model delivers.
Third, we make the strong assumption that control of the machine and receipt of cashfiow
from selling a final good are inextricably linked. We expect that richer models based on weaker
assumptions would yield similar results (if they can be solved).
Fourth, we have binary investments in cost reduction and information acquisition (at costs KE
and KM, respectively), rather than continuous investment opportunities. It seems straightforward
to allow the probability of success (in cost reduction or information acquisition) to be an increasing
function of the investment level, which in turn has convex cost.
Fifth, we assume inelastic widget supply x. This uncertain supply plays the role of noise traders,
making the market price for widgets only partially informative about v, so that parties may benefit
from costly acquisition of information about v.
Sixth, as in GHP, our assumptions that all the random variables are uniform allow us to compute
a closed-form (indeed, piece-wise linear) solution for the equilibrium price function for the inter-
mediate good. This tractability is useful in the computing the returns to alternative governance
structures, at the firm level, and hence the fraction of firms choosing each governance structure, at
the industry level.
Seventh, as in Grossman-Stiglitz and the ensuing rational-expectations literature, our model of
price formation is a reduced-form model of price-taking behavior, rather than an extensive-form
model of strategic decision-making (which might allow information transmission during the price-
formation process, either by the parties as described in our model or by one party who separates
from his engineer and becomes something like a marketer). See GHP for an extended discussion.
3.3 Individual Firm Behavior
As a building block for our ultimate analysis, we first analyze the behavior of a single firm taking
the market price p as given. Optimal behavior involves purchasing a widget only if one is going to
produce. Define the gross surplus to the parties in a firm as GS" = 7r + 7F1, i.e.
GS (gi, sj) = lfqi= [E [vlsg,,p(-,-) =p] - p - (c. - 6j)] .
The efficient production decision is q,* = 1 if E ,, [v| s9, p] > p-+ci - 6j,and the maximized expected
gross surplus in period 4 is then
GS| (g2 , sj) = E.,, [ (v - ci + 6i - p) q* (gi, si, p)| s, p].
Recall that the controller of the machine both controls the production decisions and receives
the cashflows. Consequently, the non-owner receives zero. These payoffs determine the parties'
investment incentives in period 3, as follows.
Let the subscript pair (I, 0) denote the situation in which Mi invested and hence is informed
about v but E did not invest in cost reduction. Likewise (U, A), denotes the situation in which Mi
did not invest but Ei did, hence reducing production costs by A, and (U, 0) denotes the situation
in which neither invested. Now define the following:
?rr,o = Ec [GSi' (M, si)] if pi = v, 61 0,
TruA Eci [GSZ (E, si)] if ,i = 0, 6Z = A, and
,ru,o =Ec [GSi' (gi, si)] if (pt 0, 6= 0.
Formally, these expectations are triple integrals over (ci, x, v) space:
/- -z -op(x~v7r1 l pXxIv)(v - p (x, v) - c.) dF (ci, x, v)
/-0 -- -E[vp]-p(x,v)+A7rU,A = (v -p(x,v) +A - ci)dF(c-,x,v), and
7ruy,o = J(v - p(x, v) - c,) dF (c, x, v),
where F is the joint distribution function.
Since one party's expected payoff in period 4 is independent of its investment, at most one party
will invest in period 3. If Ei controls the machine (gi = E), she will invest if 7ru,A - KE 7E,O.
Similarly, if Mi controls the machine (gi = M), he will invest if rr1 ,0 - KM > Tr ,o. We assume
that KE and KM are small relative to the benefits of investment, so the party that controls the
machine will invest.4
To proceed, we need to compute the price function p (x, v) . This involves analyzing the behavior
of other firms, as follows.
4 This condition can be stated in terms of primitives of the model, but since this is the economic assumption we
are making, we state it in this fashion.
3.4 Rational Expectations in the Market for Intermediate Goods
Recall that there is a unit mass of firms indexed by i E [0, 1]. Who buys a widget? Let
cAuj (v,p) = v - p be the highest cost at which a marketer who has invested in information (and
hence knows v) would be prepared to produce a final good, and similarly let CE (p) = E [v p]-p+A
be the highest cost at which an engineer who has invested in cost reduction (but not information)
would be prepared to produce. Suppose (as we will endogenize below) that a fraction A of firms
have M control (and hence know v), whereas fraction 1-- A have E control (and hence costs reduced
by A). Demand for widgets is therefore
AV - p - + (1 A) E [vfp (x,v) =p] +A - p - c
c-c c-c
The market-clearing price equates this demand with the supply, which recall is x, so
p = (1 - A) E [vlp (x, v) = p] + Av - (C-- cg) x + (1 - A) A - c.
The conditional expectation of v given p therefore must satisfy
_p + (C- -fc) x + c - (1 - A) A - AV
E [ vIp(-,- =p (3.1)1 - A
where the equivalence relation indicates that (3.1) must hold as an identity in x and v.
Definition 3.1 Assume fractions y,, pro, IyUA, Iuo of firms are, respectively, informed and have
cost reduction, informed and do not have cost reduction, uninformed and have cost reduction, and
uninformed and do not have cost reduction. A rational expectations equilibrium ("REE") is
a price function p (x, v) and a production allocation {qj i[O,1] such that
1. qi = q* (gi, si, p) for all i, and
2. The market for widgets clears for each (x, v) E [x, X] x [v, V].
The fact that the non-controller receives none of the cashfiow implies that this party will not
invest, so prA = 0. Furthermore, KE and KM small implies yUo = 0. Therefore A = pjO and
1 - A = yyA. The problem of finding a rational-expectations price function in this model thus
becomes one of finding a fixed point of (3.1). In GHP, we solve for this fixed point in a related
model, finding it to be piecewise-linear over three regions of (x, v) space: a low-price region, a
moderate-price region, and a high-price region.
Proposition 3.1 Given A, there exists an REE characterized by a price function
pA (x, v) 1 {(xv)ER)P (xv) + (x,v)ERP 2 (X, V) + I{(xv)ER} 3(x V)
where p(x, v) =i+ Oix + iv for j = 1, 2, 3.
We prove this proposition and derive the price function in appendix A, but to build some
intuition for this result, consider the figure below, which shows the three regions of (x, v) space,
R3 for j = 1, 2, 3. The low-price region R1 begins from the lowest feasible price, PL at (z, L) , and
extends up to the price p at (T, V-) . The moderate-price region R2 then extends from price p up
to the price p at (x, v), where the under- and over-lined notation for prices is chosen to match the
(x, v) coordinates. Finally, the high-price region R3 extends from p up to the highest feasible price,
PH at (x, ).-
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Figure 2: Regions of Piecewise-Linear Pricing Function
Within each region, the iso-price loci are linear. In particular, solving p3 (x, v) =p for v yields
as an iso-price line in (x, v) space. Because x and v are independent and uniform, every (x, v) point
on this line is equally likely. Thus, after observing p, an informed party projects this iso-price
line onto the v-axis and concludes that the conditional distribution of v given p is uniform, with
support depending on which region p is in. For example, if p < p then the lower bound on o is
v and the upper bound is some '0 (p) < U. Alternatively, if p < p < p then the lower and upper
bounds on v are o and 09, so p is uninformative. Finally, if p > p then the lower bound is some
v (p) > v and the upper bound is ).5
Given this uniform conditional distribution of v given p, the conditional expectation on the
left-hand side of (3.1) is then the average of these upper and lower bounds on v. The coefficients
/3o, /, and /3- can then be computed by substituting p2 (x, v) for p on both sides of (3.1) and
equating coefficients on like terms so that (3.1) holds as an identity. The slope of an iso-price line,
-/# 03, is decreasing in A, meaning that in regions 1 and 3 uninformed parties can make tighter
estimates of v from p when more parties are informed.
3.5 Industry Equilibrium
To recapitulate, Section 3 analyzed the production decision, taking p (-,-) as exogenous, and Section
4 endogenized prices. In this section, therefore, we endogenize the governance-structure choices of
each firm and define an industry equilibrium, as follows.
Definition 3.2 An industry equilibrium is a set of firms of mass A*, a price function p (x, v),
and a production allocation {qi1 such that
1. Each firm optimally chooses gi, with a fraction A* choosing gi = M;
2. Each party optimally chooses whether or not to invest;
3. qj = q* (gi, si, p) and wi = w* (gi, si, p) ; and
4. The market for widgets clears for each (x, v) E [x, 2] x [v, V].
The choice in period 2 is between the two possible governance structures: gi = E or gi = M.
Given A, the ex ante expected net surpluses from choosing the two governance structures are
NSE (A) = wuA (A) - KE, and
NSM (A) = o (A) - KM.
In an interior equilibrium, firms must be indifferent between the two governance structures. Thus
our goal is to find A* such that NSE (A*) = NSM (A*) and to characterize how A* varies as we
"Note that in this model, as in GHP but not Grossman-Stiglitz, extreme prices are very informative and inter-
mediate prices are less informative. In fact, with the slopes of the price functions as drawn in the above figure,
intermediate price are completely uninformative.
change the parameters of the model. For simplicity we assume that KE = KM = K. (The case
where KE # KM is discussed at the end of this section.) We therefore seek A* such that
7 10 (A*) = gru (A*),
or equivalently,
7r,o (A*) - 7ru,o (A 7ru,A (A*) - 7u,o (A*). (3.2)
To keep notation compact, let o-v = (v - v) and e1 = (z - x). We will use the following
fact (which is derived in the appendix).
Fact 3.1 Assume A < (5 - c) l. Then
r,o (A-rv,o (A) 1 - (_ - _ A and2c-c E2c-cux
WUA~~ ()w,()= A2  1 A 2
U'A (A) -Aru,o (A) = - - + A .
Observe that the first expression is decreasing in A and the second is increasing in A. This leads
to the following characterization of industry equilibrium.
Proposition 3.2 Assume (E - c) " > 1. For all 5 c, e0, am, A > 0 with c > A, there exists an
industry equilibrium. Further,
.2+ A2 - 2(C- -cf)pxA
A = - (3.3)
v Ov/orx + 2A 2
2 c-c
if the right-hand side of (3.3) is in [0, 1]. If the right-hand side of (3.3) is less than 0, then A* = 0;
if it is greater than 1, then A* = 1.
Proof. If o2, < 2 (C - c) pLoA - A2 , then 7ru,o (0) < 7rU,A (0) and thus, since the left-hand side of
(2) is decreasing in A, it follows that A* = 0. Similarly, if r2 1 E-f) > 2 (5-c) [11A + A2,
then 7ru,o (1) WU,A (1), and since the right-hand side of (2) is increasing in A, we must have that
A* = 1. Otherwise, we want to find A* such that
0 = ro(A*) - 7ruA (A*)
o2, + A 2 - 2(5 - c) p.A A* (/ 0 o 2  A
2(5-c) 2(i-c) -c 2
which yields expression (3.3). a
Proposition 3.2 is our main result, establishing that, given our rational expectations equilibrium,
there exists a unique industry equilibrium and providing an explicit expression for the proportion of
firms that choose each of the governance structures. As the proposition makes clear, this proportion
may well be interior.6 Recall, however, that our firms are homogeneous ex ante, so an incomplete-
contract style analysis (taking each firm in isolation) would prescribe that they all choose the
same governance structure. In this sense, the informativeness of the price mechanism can induce
heterogeneous behaviors from homogenous firms. To put this point differently, in this model, the
price mechanism can be seen as endogenizing the parameters of the incomplete-contract model so
that firms are indifferent between governance structures. In a richer model, with heterogeneous
investment costs, almost every firm would have strict preferences between governance structures,
with only the marginal firm being indifferent.
We are also able to perform some comparative statics. First, when the ex ante level of fun-
damental uncertainty increases (i.e., ar, is higher), the return to investing in acquiring information
increases, so A increases. An increase in noise (i.e., ax is higher) has an identical effect. An
increase in px increases the probability of production, which disproportionately benefits E-control
firms, decreasing A. Finally, an increase in A has two effects. The first is the partial-equilibrium
channel through which an increase in the benefits of choosing engineer ownership (and hence invest-
ing in cost reduction) makes engineer control relatively more appealing, reducing A. In an industry
equilibrium, however, there is also a price effect. For a fixed fraction 1 - A of parties that invest
in cost reduction, an increase in A makes widgets more valuable, which in turn increases demand
and hence average prices. Since firms with engineer control purchase widgets over a larger region
of the ci space than do firms with marketing control, the former face this increase in average price
level relatively more than do firms with marketer control, so the price effect militates towards an
increase in A. Which of these two effects dominates depends on the parameters of the model. We
give formal statements of these results in the following proposition.
Proposition 3.3 Assume (s - c) - > 1. For all 5 c, x, an, A > 0 with c > A and A* E (0, 1),
we have that: (i) A* is increasing in au, (ii) A* is increasing in a1 , (iii) A* is decreasing in
"Models of industry equilibrium from IO (Ordover, Saloner, and Salop (1990)) and trade (McLaren (2000), Gross-
man and Helpman (2002), Antras (2003)) typically feature strategic complementarities in governance structure, and
hence generically produce equilibria in which ex ante identical firms organize identically. One exception to this is
Avenel (2008), who shows that investments in cost reduction (and hence governance structures that promote cost
reduction) are strategic substitutes when firms compete Bertrand.
p-, and (iv) if A < (Z - c) p, then A* is decreasing in A, otherwise there exists a e% satisfying
0 < a-V < 2zA -_)px such that A* is decreasing in A whenever a- > &, and increasing in A
whenever o-, < &c.
Proof. See appendix. U
3.5.1 REE meets incomplete contracts
A further observation is that our incomplete-contracts approach sheds new light on the functioning
of the price mechanism. In particular, most partially-revealing REE models compare the benefits
of acquiring information to the exogenously specified costs of acquiring information. As our model
shows, however, what matters is not only these exogenous costs, KM, but also the opportunity
cost of choosing a governance structure that provides incentives to invest in information (namely,
the foregone opportunity for cost reduction). To analyze these opportunity costs, consider the
expression for A* when KE # KM:
A .2 + A 2 - 2 (5 - c) (p,A + Km - KE)
V 0'O/Ox + 2A 2
2 c-c
Note the presence of production parameters, such as A and KE, which have nothing per se to
do with market clearing or price formation. More importantly, note that comparative statics
regarding the informativeness of the price mechanism, such as &A*/&KM, can depend on production
parameters such as A.
In addition to comparative statics that illustrate the potential effects of production parameters
on rational-expectations equilibrium, we can also say something about how the production environ-
ment affects markets. For example, in GHP we showed that (as in Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980)
market thickness depends on A*, with concomitant implications for economic efficiency and welfare.
In this paper's setting, therefore, market thickness depends on production parameters such as A
and KE.
3.6 Markets and Hierarchies Revisited
Coase (1937: 359) argued that "it is surely important to enquire why co-ordination is the work of
the price mechanism in one case and of the entrepreneur in the other" (emphasis added). Similarly,
Williamson's (1975) title famously emphasized "Markets" as the alternative to hierarchy. However,
over the next 35 years the market disappeared from the literature on firms' boundaries. Instead,
the literature focused on the choice of firm boundaries at the transaction level.
While our main focus is on the interaction between the choice of organizational designs by indi-
vidual firms and the informativeness of the market's price mechanism, a straightforward extension
of our model also sheds light on the interaction between the choice of individual firms' boundaries
and the informativeness of the price mechanism. Like our analysis of organizational designs, this
section shows that omitting the price mechanism from the analysis of firms' boundaries can be
problematic. In particular, we find that incentives to make specific investments (which now drive
firms' boundary decisions) affect the informativeness of the price mechanism and vice versa.
To extend and reinterpret our model, consider a vertical production process with three stages
(1, 2, and 3) and a different asset used at each stage (A1 , A 2 , and A 3 ). There are again two parties,
now denoted upstream (formerly E) and downstream (formerly M). The conditions of production
are such that it is optimal for the upstream party (U) to own A 1 and for the downstream party
(D) to own A 3 , so there are only two governance structures of interest (namely, U owns A 2 or D
owns it). Thus, the asset A 2 is analogous to the machine from our original model, but we now
focus on asset ownership as determining the boundary of the firm, rather than machine control as
determining organizational designs. Because upstream necessarily owns A 1 and downstream A 3 , we
interpret U ownership of A 2 as forward vertical integration and D ownership as backward. Beyond
this reinterpretation of governance structures in terms of firms' boundaries, all the formal aspects
of the model are unchanged.
Under this reinterpretation, analogs of Propositions 3.1 through 3.3 continue to hold. 7 In par-
ticular, our characterizations of the rational-expectations equilibrium and the industry equilibrium
continue to hold, as do the comparative-statics results. Given this reinterpretation, the next two
sub-sections explore the implications of the informativeness of the price mechanism for two leading
theories of firms' boundaries: the property-rights theory (PRT) of Grossman and Hart (1986) and
Hart and Moore (1990), and the transaction-cost economics (TCE) theory of Williamson (1971,
1975, 1979).
'For formal statements and proofs, see an earlier working-paper version: Gibbons, Holden and Powell (2009),
available at www.nber.org.
3.6.1 PRT Meets REE
Property-rights theory emphasizes the importance of specific investments for the choice of gover-
nance structure. To mimic the PRT, we eliminate the price mechanism in our model by supposing
that a dyad (i.e., parties U and D) believes p (x, v) = p for all A, x, and v and hence does not
recognize that prices are informative.
Fact 3.2 If p (x, v) - p for all A, x, and v, then the benefits from choosing gi = U are given by
1 u2
WU,A - WU,0 = ~ -c'u-2 c - c'
and the benefits from choosing gi = D are
1 A 2 + 2 (p - p - c)
7r,o - rU,o= 5-c
The dyad therefore chooses upstream ownership if o2 > A2 + 2 (p' - p - c) A, chooses down-
stream ownership if this inequality is reversed, and is indifferent if the inequality is replaced with
an equality. Generically, one of these two inequalities must hold, so the PRT prescription will be
either that all dyads are forward integrated or that all dyads are backward-integrated (because the
dyads are identical ex ante).
In our model, however, the informativeness of the price mechanism endogenizes the returns
to specific investments. In particular, dyads that would have chosen to invest in information
acquisition (by choosing downstream ownership of asset A 2) under the assumptions of Fact 3.2
may now free-ride on the information contained in the market price and choose instead to invest
in cost reduction (by choosing to have upstream ownership of asset A2). In fact, in our model,
certain governance structures may be sustained in equilibrium only because the price system allows
some firms to benefit from the information-acquisition investments of others. More specifically, as
we began to explain after Proposition 3.2, the equilibrium fraction of firms choosing downstream
ownership in our model, A* in (3.3), is often interior, rather than zero or one, as is generically true
in a PRT analysis of ex ante identical dyads.
Figure 3 illustrates the difference between our analysis and PRT by plotting APRT versus our
A* from Proposition 2. To plot this figure, we fix A = 1/4, 5 - c = 1, and p, = 0.8, so that a PRT
analysis predicts that all firms will choose downstream ownership (i.e., A*R = 1) if 2! > 0.3375,
all firms will choose engineer ownership (APRT = 0) when r2 < 0.3375, and firms will be indifferent
(A*RT E [0, 1]) when (7 = 0.3375. The figure also shows our model's equilibrium A* as a function
of av for three different values of or (namely, 1/10, 1, and 10), with A* falling with as for a fixed
2f. Our equilibrium converges to A* 1 more slowly (and especially slowly for lower values of
cex).-
2(c-c) A-M
Figure 3: Comparison with PRT
As drawn in the figure, the PRT analysis ignores the informativeness of the price mechanism.
As a result, AURT > A* for all values of al. Alternatively, if the price mechanism was recognized as
being partially but exogenously informative, then this would shift the vertical PRT line to the right,
and it could be possible that APRT < A* for all values of a. The key idea here is that the PRT
takes the environment in which firms operate (here, the informativeness of the price mechanism) as
exogenous, whereas we highlight the two-way interaction between firms and their environment. As
a result, empirical tests of PRT that utilize the importance of specific investments (as in Fact 3.2)
may be misleading, by failing to consider the role that the price mechanism plays in endogenizing
the returns to specific investments.
3.6.2 TCE Meets REE
Turning from PRT to TCE, recall that Williamson explicitly comments on Hayek's (1945) discussion
of the price mechanism, arguing that "prices often do not qualify as sufficient statistics and that a
substitution of internal organization (hierarchy) for market-mediated exchange often occurs on this
account" (1975: 5). Our model allows us to assess this observation, if we can be precise about two
things: (i) what it means for prices not to "qualify as sufficient statistics" and (ii) what is meant
by "market-mediated exchange."
A natural way to assess the extent to which prices are sufficient statistics is the following.
Definition 3.3 The equilibrium informativeness of the price system is the expected reduc-
tion in variance Ex,, oT - o that is obtained by conditioning on prices.
In our model, the equilibrium informativeness of the price system is given by
E [0. -r a2I' = A v .V '
" - 2 c - c
Naturally, this informativeness is increasing in the fraction of firms that become informed, A. And
in our model "market-mediated exchange" also has a natural interpretation: it means relying on
information about v from the price mechanism, rather than acquiring it directly (i.e., upstream
ownership rather than downstream). In these terms, Williamson's claim can be stated as: when
E o - T2 J] falls, A* increases.
In our model, A is endogenous, so it matters what causes E [cr2 - o to decrease and what
other effects that underlying change has on A. For example, if o- increases then it can be shown
that informativeness decreases and A* increases, as Williamson conjectured. On the other hand,
many other changes in exogenous variables can lead simultaneously to a decrease in informativeness
and a decrease in A*. For example, it is straightforward to see that an increase in pux decreases both
informativeness and A*. And an increase in 5 - c can do likewise, as reported in the following
result.
Proposition 3.4 Assume (5 - c) -- ;> 1 and A* E (0, 1). Define w = If
1 ax ~ -- A __V____
2 d-aW+ A2 2 ( -c)A A < 2 (5 - c) A'
2 ax
then mVIP > 0 and a, > 0.o aw a
Proof. See appendix. *
3.7 Conclusion
We view firms and the market not only as alternative ways of organizing economic activity, but
also as institutions that interact and shape each other. In particular, by combining features of
the incomplete-contract theory of firms' organizational designs and boundaries, together with the
rational-expectations theory of the price mechanism, we have developed a model that incorpo-
rates two, reciprocal considerations. First, firms operate in the context of the market (specifically,
the informativeness of the price mechanism affects parties' optimal governance structures). And
second, the buyers in the market for an intermediate good are firms (specifically, parties' gover-
nance structures affect how they behave in this market and hence the informativeness of the price
mechanism).
In the primary interpretation of our model in terms of organizational design we provide a
formal explanation for why similar (possibly ex ante identical) firms choose different structures
and strategies (specifically, exploration or exploitation). Our analysis also demonstrates that
viewing an individual firm, or transaction, as the unit of analysis can be misleading. Because of
the interaction between firm-level governance choices and the industry-wide informativeness of the
price mechanism, equilibrium governance choices are shaped by industry-wide factors.
We also showed that our model can be reinterpreted to address firms' boundaries. Again,
considering the endogenous informativeness of prices implies that both property-rights theory and
transaction-cost economics abstract from potentially important issues by focusing on the transaction
as the unit of analysis.
To develop and analyze our model, we imposed several strong assumptions that might be relaxed
in future work. For example, to eliminate a market for machines, we assumed that machines are
dyad-specific. Also, as in our paper on price formation (where we analyze individual investors
instead of firms), we ignore the possibility of strategic information transmission before or during
the price-formation process. We hope to explore these and other possibilities in future work.
3.8 Appendix A: Computation of Price Function
This appendix outlines the approach for constructing the price function that is used throughout
the paper. In doing so, we establish the existence of a partially revealing rational expectations
equilibrium and prove proposition 3.1.
Proposition 3.5 Given A, there exists an REE characterized by a price function
3
PA (x, v) = 1 f(xv)ERj}PJA (x, v),
j=1
where pi (x,v) =# + #x + 0#v for j = 1, 2,3.
As in standard Walrasian general equilibrium theory, the markets must clear for each realization
of pA (x, v), but as in Grossman-Stiglitz, demand is partially determined by the function PA (- -)
as well as its particular realization. A REE price function must therefore be a fixed point of the
following identity (which is a rearrangement of the market-clearing condition).
p'\ (x, V) + (c - c) X + c -( - A) A - AVE [vpA (.,) p(X, V)] (1)
where the conditional expectation is determined by Bayesian updating given a price realization and
assuming the equilibrium price function.
An iso-price locus is a set of (x, v) pairs over which p (x, v) is constant. We assume that p (-,-)
is increasing in v, decreasing in x, and that its iso-price curves are linear with constant slope for
all (x, v) (conditions that will of course need to be verified).
Define PL = PA (z, v) and PH = PA (x, V) to be, respectively, the lowest and highest possible
prices, and define p = PA (T, 7) and p = PA (x, v). There are two possible cases. Case I (with




Case I Case 2
Further, define R', R , and R3 to be, respectively, the low-, mid-, and high-price regions of the
(x, v). That is,
RI = (x, v) :p,\ (x, v) < min {p, -}}
R {(x, v) :min {p,} < px (x, v) max {p,ip}}
{(x, v): p (x, v) > max {p,}}.
Assume we are in case I. The derivation proceeds similarly for case II, and we will describe
how to determine which case applies below.
Suppose (x, v) E R'. Then because x and v are independent and uniform, the conditional
distribution vp (, -) = pA (x, v) ~ U [vl (pA (x, v)) , V' (pA (x, v))], where v (p) and V1 (p) are
the lowest and highest values of v consistent with the realized price p. As illustrated in the
following diagram, since (x, v) E R1, it is clear that v1 (p) = E. V1 (p) on the other hand, solves





Since we have conjectured that pl (x, v) = 01 + 3x + /3v, we have
V1 (p1 (X, v)) = v - /1(z - z).-10
#2
The conditional expectation of v given the realization of the price is therefore
E [2 , PA (X, V)] = 2 2
(1) must hold as an identity, so we can substitute (2), rearrange, and use equality of coefficients
to give us
o + ((E - c) /A) z 1 )A
(1(( - ) + (1 - )A -c( ) 2




Proceeding similarly for (x, v) E R2 (where V2 (p) v)and 2nd (x, v) E R (where
V3 (p) =V), we have
2= (1-A)L +(1-A)A-c0 2
22= A
and





Recall that we made the following assumptions in order to derive this: p, (x, v) is (1) decreasing
in x and (2) increasing in v, (3) - a / a is constant for all (x, v), and (4) case I applies. (1)ax av
and (2) are satisfied, since #j < 0 < #j for j = 1, 2, 3. (3) is satisfied, because -Oi/33 = c for
j = 1, 2, 3. Finally, we must verify that indeed case I applies. In case I, the iso-price locus (which
has slope C) is steeper than the diagonal (which has slope ) Thus, we are indeed in case I
if E-2 > or A <_ (-c) . We assume that (E - c) 2 2 1, so that this condition is satisfied
for all A. This allows us to use the same price function throughout. All of the main results of
the paper go through if we drop this assumption, but we are no longer able to obtain a closed-form
solution for the equilibrium industry structure. Computing the price function when A > (C - c) iXg
is similar to the above analysis.
3.9 Appendix B: Omitted Proofs
3.9.1 Derivation of Fact 3.1
Ex,Vc [7ru,o (A)] - Ex,v,c, [7ru,o (A)] 1 1 1 1
2C- cV - vx - X jv i: (V2- p dxdv
2 -c 25-c
which is continuous and strictly decreasing in A and similarly,
Ex,V,,c [wru,A (A)] - Exv,ci [rru,o (A)] A
2  Ex,v
2 (c - c)
c - 2 ( -C- 2(5c)
[ V (x,v) - c - Ex,v [pA (x, v)]
(c - c)
which is continuous and strictly increasing in A. For the last equalities in these two expressions,
we use the following three facts:
Ex, v 2










First note that when A < (5- c) \, P (x, v) = E3=
I-A)v + ((E - c)/
2 + (1 - A) A - c +
1I+ A
2
(1A) - 2 + (1 - A)A - c+ Av - (5- c) x
1+-A
+ (1 - A) A - c+ I -A2
((E - c) /A)I + v2
=(1 - A) - -~
Ac 'V/ux
1 + A 5-c
2 A
1 + A - c
2 A
= /v+ (1 -A) A--px (i -c)- c,
1(x,o) CRjpX (xv)
and
Sc(x V) : p (, ) < p3 (X, V)
We can rewrite the prices as
pl (x, v) pK
p (x, v) (1
p (x, v) =p
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Proof. Here, we want to compute
V !Th1 x~ J 'x(I3  _Lv) (V2iv2,
1 1








xV-V x- J x
V- pl3)2) dxdv
If we substitute and rearrange, this becomes












which was the original claim. *
Claim 3.3 Ex,i [pA (x, V)] = pv + (1 - A) A - p (E - c) - c











p (x, v) dxdv.
Ex,[v ]
y (V V) - x)
-I 7 -- (U-V) 
-4 5 -v z -x ]










Ex,v (PA (X, V)]
If we substitute and rearrange, we get
1 1
V - vjx - X
1 1 '' - A 
- V 5 X v 2
1 1 *- -x+±(v-v) 1 A
v-Vx ' x 2
or since the last two expressions are equal but with opposite signs,
EXV [PX (x, v)] = P + (1 - A) A - (5 - c) yx - c,
which is the desired expression *
3.9.2 Derivation of Fact 3.2
Explicit computation yields the following benefit for choosing g = U
1 1 1I ~P
C CV- V 5X -Xl IV.Xc
1 1 1
c-c - V x X
1 1 1 1
2= - c -v - x
1 2
2 5 - c'
and similarly the benefits for choosing g = D are
c '' 'V
(v - p - c) dcidxdv
-P
(v - p - ci) dcidxdv
(v - pi) 2 dxdv
E [7ru,A] - E [u,0] 1 
1 1  '"7 '
= 5_ _i _ Lv l
1 1 1
5 - c V1 - VX- X
1A 2 +2(iv -p-c)A
2 5-c
IV JX Ip\ (x,v) dxdv
.v
-v) - (X - X) dxdv
5-c dIdv
-v - -x-Ad d
E (,ru,o] - E [,ru,]
I 'v -P+
e
1 1 1/* f "v~P
c- cov- ., 'v ex
(v -p+A -ci)dcidxdv
(v - p - c,) dcidxdv
'" '/ A2




Proof of Proposition 3. To establish that A* is increasing in C1 , note that at A = 0, the gains
from choosing integration (and hence becoming informed) instead of non-integration (and hence
enjoying a cost reduction) are given by
(TSU - TSD) (A = 0) =TV2,+ A2 - 2 (C -- c) y,,A
S2(5 - c)
and at A = 1, the gains from choosing integration over non-integration are
(TSU - TSD) 1A =v 2) _ _
2(5-c) 2 c) - 2(C-c)
Since we are at an interior solution, (TSU - TSD) (A = 0) > 0 and (TSU - TSD) (A 1) <0.
Next, note that (TSU - TSD) (A = 0) is increasing in 0v and (TSU - TSD) (A = 1) is increasing
in aT if (5 - c) E > 1, which is true since (e - c) x > 1. Since (TSU - TSD) (A) is linear in A,
this then implies that A* is increasing in o-,.
The comparative statics with respect to p, and o are straightforward. Finally, note that
8A* A -(5 c) tx - 2A*A
19A av/O-x of 2+ 2A2+-c 2
When A < (C - c) pix, this is clearly negative. Otherwise, if , note that at av = 0, 2A*A
A - 2 (c - c) px, so this expression is positive. For or > 2A(,-f)t'x the expression is negative.
Since A* is increasing in av, this implies that there is a cutoff value 0 < 6v < 2A(- c)ii a function3A+(c-c)p
of the other parameters of the model, for which a, < a- implies that 9- > 0 and gv > as implies
that f < 0..
Proof of Proposition 3.4. Note that
aA* 2w-2 PxA - 02 g
2ox > 0
e ne + 2A 22 ax
whenever
1 v Zv u 2 + A 2  2_+_A_
2 ax 22 1 A<
2 _uW + 2Aw- 2w-1 A'
B9Ex,v o.2 _ 72 S- IP]
Dow
r27 o A 2  , 2w-1p.A
= A + >02 -2 OLW+2A2 ouaw+2A 2  '
2 o-, 2 ex
so that equilibrium informativeness is always increasing in w. n
and
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